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I. INTRODUCrION
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)1 provides that it shall not be
construed "to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike,"
except as expressly stated therein. 2 The NLRA is silent on the right of private
employers3 to replace striking workers. Since NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph
Co.,4 however, the settled rule in private sector labor law has been that an employer
may hire permanent replacements for economic strikers-that is, workers who are
striking to force compliance with the union's collective bargaining demands.5 In
contrast, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 6 has held consistently that
during unfair labor practice strikes7 only temporary replacements may be used 8 and
that all unfair labor practice strikers are, therefore, entitled to reinstatement.9
The recently enacted Ohio Public Employee Collective Bargaining Law
(PECBL)10 authorizes certain nonsafety public employees to engage in an economic
strike after appropriate notices have been given and all impasse procedures have been
* Assistant Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law. B.S., 1973, University of Kansas; J.D.,
1976, New York University. The author expresses appreciation to Professor Lee Modjeska, who read and commented on
a draft of this Article, and to Joan L. Irwin, who assisted with research. This Article is part of a work-in-progress that
will compare the entire Ohio Public Employee Collective Bargaining Law with the framework and construction of the
National Labor Relations Act.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
2. Id. § 163.
3. Public employers are excluded from the NLRA. See id. § 152(2) (term "employer" does not include a state
or political subdivision thereof).
4. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
5. See, e.g., Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720, 725 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964).
The employer is limited only by its duty not to discriminate against certain strikers because of their union activities. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Wiltse, 188 F.2d 917, 924-25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 859 (1951). See also infra note 41.
6. The NLRB is the agency created by Congress to administer the NLRA. The NLRB's powers are set forth in
29 U.S.C. § 153 (1982).
7. An unfair labor practice strike is a work stoppage protesting an employer's unfair labor practice. R. GORMAN,
Bssic Tm-r ON LABOR LAw, UNMIzATION AND COU.ECnVE BAmoAmao 339 (1976). Some strikes involve a mixture of unfair
labor practices and economic factors. See infra note 70.
8. Scobell Chem. Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1130, 1132 (1958), enforced, 267 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1959).
9. Kitty Clover, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 1665, enforced, 208 F.2d 212 (8th Cir. 1953).
10. Oro REv. CoD ANN. §§ 4117.01-.23 (Page Supp. 1984) (effective Apr. 1, 1984). See generally R. LARsoN,
T. BurmwAs, K. Amus & D. WARo, Pusuc SEcToR CouxcnvE BARoARo: Tue Oeo Svstem (1984); J. Lmvws & S. SpiRN,
Oino Cou.cnvE BARGAINIG LAw: THE REGuLATos or Puuc E movE-E.vaeLOYE LABOR Rn.AIONS (1983); J. O'REaLY, OHo
Pusuc E.srnioamE CouzcnvE BARGAINNo (1984); BszcxE & EcKnR,, A SUtrNARY OFTHE ORo Pusuc EMLoYEs CoLLEcovE
BARo'Nano Act (1983); Bumpass & Ashmus, Public Sector Bargaining in a Democracy: An Assessment of the Ohio Public
Employee Collective Bargaining Law, 33 CLEv. ST. L. Rev. 593 (1985); O'Reilly, Ohio Begins Public Sector Bargaining:
"The Best of Times" Lies Ahead, 35 CASE W. Ran. L. REv. 426 (1985); O'Reilly &Gath, Structures and Conflicts: Ohio's
Collective Bargaining Law for Public Employees, 44 OHio ST. L.J. 891 (1983); White, Kaplan & Hawkins, Ohio's Public
Employee Bargaining Law: Can It Withstand Constitutional challenge?, 53 U. CN. L. REv. 1 (1984); Note, Student
Project: Public Sector Collective Bargaining in Ohio: Before and After Senate Bill No. 133, 17 AKRON L. Rev. 229 (1983);
Legislation Note, S. 133: Ohio's Public-Sector Collective-Bargaining Framework, 9 U. DAYToN L. REv. 583 (1984);
Comment, Public Employee Collective Bargaining Becomes a Matter of Right in Ohio, 13 CAP. U.L. Rev. 219 (1983).
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exhausted. It Like the NLRA, the PECBL is silent on whether public employers in
Ohio may replace lawfully striking workers. Neither the Ohio State Employment
Relations Board (SERB) t2 nor the courts have had occasion yet to rule on the right
of public employers in Ohio to replace economic strikers.
This Article addresses a single question: May public employers in Ohio replace
lawful economic strikers? In seeking an answer this Article examines the right to
strike under the PECBL, the employer's right to replace strikers under private sector
labor law, the distinctions between private and public sector strikes, the pertinent
language and legislative history of the PECBL, the Ohio civil service law, the due
process clauses of the Ohio and the United States Constitutions, and the relevant
precedents in other jurisdictions. None of these provide a conclusive answer.
Consequently, in the absence of a clear directive from the legislature, the answer
requires a policy choice by the SERB and, eventually, the courts. This Article surveys
the range of choices and, after considering the competing considerations, concludes
that permitting temporary replacements but prohibiting permanent replacements best
accommodates the interests involved.
I. THE RIGHT TO STRIKE UNDER THE PECBL
Ohio is one of twelve states that does not prohibit all public employees from
striking. 13 The PECBL grants an affirmative right to strike to some public employ-
ees; 14 however, this grant contains substantial limitations.' 5 Only state and local
employees who meet the PECBL's definition of "public employees"' 6 and who are
11. OHIO REv. CODE AN. § 4117.14(D)(2) (Page Supp. 1984). See infra Part 11.
12. The SERB is the agency created by the Ohio General Assembly to administer the PECBL. The SERB's powers
are set forth in OHeO REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.02 (Page Supp. 1984).
13. Besides Ohio, limited statutory strike rights exist in Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See ALASA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1984); HAWAI REv. STAT. § 89-12 (1976
& Supp. 1984); IDo CODE § 44-1811 (1977), as construed in Local 1494, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur
d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 642, 586 P.2d 1346, 1357 (1978); ILu. AN. STAT. ch. 48 § 1617 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); ML,-.
STAT. § 179 A.18 (1984); Mormr. CODE ANN. § 39-31-201 (1983), as construed in State ex reL Dep't of Highways v. Pub.
Employees Craft Council, 165 Mont. 349, 351-54, 529 P.2d 785, 786-88 (1974); OR. REv. STAT. § 243.726 (1983); 43
PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §9 1101.1001-.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730 (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ I11.70(4)(cm)(6)(c) (West Supp. 1985). In addition, the California Supreme Court, after noting the legislative silence
on the issue, has held that it will not recognize the common law prohibition against public sector strikes, unless the strike
poses an imminent threat to public health or safety. County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees
Ass'n, Local 660, 38 Cal. 3d 564, 585-86, 699 P.2d 835, 849-50, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, 438-39 (1985).
14. OHIo REv. CODs AmN. § 4117.14(D)(2) (Page Supp. 1984). For other discussions of the right to strike under the
PECBL see BRICKER & Ecru.sR, supra note 10, 36-44; R. LARSON, T. BuspwAs, K. Asmius & D. WARD, supra note 10,
91-99; J. O'RtTu.v, supra note 10, 81-84; Bumpass & Ashmus, supra note 10; O'Reilly & Gath, supra note 10, 919-27;
Legislation Note, supra note 10, 595-601; Note, supra note 10, 243-44.
15. One type of work stoppage, however, is not subject to any statutory limitation. The PECBL provides that
"[stoppage of work by employees in good faith because of dangerous or unhealthful working conditions at the place of
employment which are abnormal to the place of employment shall not be deemed a strike." Owo REv. CODs AN. §
4117.01(H) (Page Supp. 1984). Consequently, no state or local employee is subject to the PECBL's restrictions on the
right to strike if she in good faith ceases working because of abnormally dangerous or unhealthful working conditions.
16. Id. § 4117.01(C) defines "public employee." This definition excludes, among others, supervisors, managerial
employees, confidential employees, court employees, SERB employees, and legislative employees. In addition, employ-
ees of municipal corporations and townships with populations of less than 5,000 are not "public employees" because their
employers do not satisfy the definition of a "public employer." Id. § 4117.01 (B). Thus, many persons who are employed
by state or local government entities are not permitted to strike because they are not "public employees" as defined by
the PECBL.
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not precluded from striking by the PECBL are authorized to strike. PECBL prohibits,
among others, safety personnel, guards, and certain medical workers from striking. 17
Furthermore, even those public employees permitted to strike do not have an
unlimited right to do so. To constitute a legal strike, a series of notice requirements
and impasse procedures must be followed by the union. First, no lawful strike may
occur upon the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement unless the union
triggers a negotiation period by sending a written notice to the employer requesting
negotiations at least sixty days earlier.18 When there is no pre-existing collective
bargaining agreement, the union must serve a written notice initiating the negotiation
period at least ninety days before a strike.19 Second, forty-five days before the end of
the negotiation period, the union and the employer must permit a mediator to assist
them in the negotiations. 20 Third, thirty days before the end of the negotiation period,
both parties must submit their positions on each issue to a fact-finding panel which
will make a recommendation on each unresolved issue. 2' Fourth, even though all
impasse procedures have been followed, the union, prior to striking, must give the
employer written notice of its intention to strike ten days in advance.22 Finally,
17. Id. § 4117.15(A). The following public employees are prohibited from striking:
members of a police or fire department, members of the state highway patrol, deputy sheriffs, dispatchers
employed by a police, fire or sheriffs department or the state highway patrol or civilian dispatchers employed
by a public employer other than a police, fire, or sheriff's department to dispatch police, fire, sheriffs
department, or emergency medical or rescue personnel and units, an exclusive nurse's unit, employees of the
state school for the deaf or the state school for the blind, employees of any public employee retirement system,
correction officers, guards at penal or mental institutions, or special policemen or policewomen appointed in
accordance with sections 5119.14 and 5123.13 of the Revised Code, psychiatric attendants employed at mental
health forensic facilities [and] youth leaders employed at juvenile correctional facilities ....
Id. These employees, if their union and employer have been unable to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement after
using mediation and fact-finding, must use binding final-offer arbitration, referred to in the PECBL as "conciliation."
See id. § 4117.14(D)(1), (G).
18. Id. § 4117.14(B)(3). For each day closer than sixty days before the contract's expiration date that notice is
given, the strike must be delayed one day. Id. For example, a notice of desire to bargain served 45 days before expiration
of the collective bargaining agreement triggers a 60-day pre-strike waiting period; therefore, the union must wait 15 days
after expiration of the contract to strike. In addition to serving written notice of a desire to negotiate upon the employer,
a copy of the written notice and a copy of the existing collective bargaining agreement must be served upon the SERB.
Id. § 4117.14(B)(I)(c).
19. Id. § 4117.14(B)(2).
20. Id. § 4117.14(C)(2). The SERB will select the mediator. Id. The mediator has fourteen days to assist the union
and the employer to reach an agreement before the SERB will appoint a fact-finding panel. Id. § 4117.14(C)(3). The SERB
may continue mediation while fact-finding is occurring. Id. § 4117.14(C)(3)(b).
21. Id. § 4117.14(C)(3). Fact-finding as conducted under the PECBL is really advisory arbitration, although the
fact-finding panel may attempt mediation. Id. § 4117.14(C)(4)(f). The panel investigates all unresolved issues, receives
each party's written statement on each issue, and holds hearings. Id. § 4117.14(C)(3)(a), (4)(a). The panel must issue
written findings of facts and recommendations on unresolved issues within 14 days after appointment unless the parties
mutually agree to an extension. Id. § 4117.14(C)(5). Unless the union or the employer's governing legislative body rejects
the panel's recommendations by a three-fifths vote of its respective membership within seven days after the recommen-
dations are issued, the fact-finding panel's recommendations are deemed agreed upon. Id. § 4117.14(C)(6). Although the
PECBL does not expressly require the union to take a vote before striking, this procedure, in practical effect, amounts
to a requirement that at least sixty percent of the membership prefer a strike to accepting the fact finder's recommendations
whenever the employer's governing legislative body has not rejected the recommendations. If either party rejects the
recommendations, they are published, id., for such influence on public opinion as they may have while the parties resume
bargaining, probably with the renewed assistance of a mediator. Id. § 4117.14(D)(2).
22. Id. §§ 4117.11(B)(8), .14(D)(2). A written notice stating the date and the time the strike will begin must be
served on both the employer and the SERB. Id. § 4117.11(B)(8). The parties may extend the effectiveness of the notice
by written mutual agreement. Id.
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although the union has complied with the sixty-day23 and the ten-day24 notice
requirements and exhausted the mediation and fact-finding impasse procedures, and
although the strike is lawful, the employer may obtain an injunction for a maximum
of sixty-three days if the "strike creates a clear and present danger to the health or
safety of the public." 25
Thus, the PECBL authorizes only economic strikes after the exhaustion of all
impasse procedures and after the appropriate notices have been given. Conversely,
strikes are not authorized during the term of a collective bargaining agreement,
26
during the pendency of impasse procedures, 27 for recognitional purposes, 28 on
account of a jurisdictional work dispute, 29 to protest an employer unfair labor
practice, 30 or by unrepresented public employees. 31 In addition to narrowly circum-
scribing the right to strike, the PECBL prohibits an employer from locking out its
employees to bring pressure on the union during collective bargaining. 32 Although the
PECBL expressly permits employers to discharge employees engaged in an unlawful
strike after a one-day notice to return to work with subsequent review by the SERB
and the courts, 33 it does not address the right of an employer to replace its lawfully
striking workers. Consequently, one must search elsewhere to determine whether
public employers in Ohio may replace lawful economic strikers.
]II. THE EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO REPLACE STRIKERS UNDER THE NLRA
In the private sector, a striking employee's right to reinstatement or, conversely,
an employer's right to replace the striker is governed by whether the work stoppage
is an economic strike or an unfair labor practice strike. 34 An economic strike is a work
stoppage by employees to demonstrate their support for either their bargaining
demands relating to wages and working conditions, or their union's request for
recognition by the employer. 35 On the other hand, an unfair labor practice strike is an
23. Id. § 4117.14(B)(1)(a). In the case of initial negotiations between the employer and the union, a 90-day
negotiation notice is required. Id. § 4117.14(B)(2).
24. Id. §§ 4117.11(B)(8), .14(D)(2).
25. Id. § 4117.16(A). Under this provision, the employer must first obtain a limited three-day temporary restraining
order from a court of common pleas. The employer must then request authorization from the SERB to enjoin the strike
beyond expiration of the three-day temporary restraining order. If the SERB finds that a clear and present danger exists,
the court that issued the restraining order may enjoin the strike for up to 60 additional days or until an agreement is reached,
whichever occurs first. Id. Once the 60-day injunction is issued, both parties must negotiate with the assistance of a
mediator. Id. § 4117.16(B). After 45 days of bargaining, if no agreement has been reached, the mediator may publish a
report on each party's position and final offer of settlement. Id. If no agreement has been reached by the end of the 60-day
injunction, the employees may resume their strike and no court may issue a further injunction. Id. § 4117.16(A).
26. Id. § 4117.18(C); see also id. § 4117.15(A).
27. Id. § 4117.18(C); see also id. § 4117.15(A).
28. See id. § 4117.1l(B)(5).
29. See id. § 4117.11(B)(4).
30. See id. § 4117.15(B).
31. Because bargaining must occur before a strike is authorized, see id. § 4117.14(D)(2), and because bargaining
must take place between an employer and the labor organization certified as the exclusive representative of employees in
an appropriate unit, see id. 99 4117.04, .05, .14, unrepresented public employees appear to have no right to strike.
32. Id. § 4117.1l(A)(7).
33. Id. § 4117.23.
34. NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 752-53 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954).
35. See NLRB v. Herman Wilson Lumber Co., 355 F.2d 426, 430 (8th Cir. 1966); see infra note 41.
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employee work stoppage provoked not by economic concerns, but by the employer's
unfair labor practices. 36 As will be discussed below, in the private sector a striking
employee has an absolute right to reinstatement when an unfair labor practice strike
is terminated, but only a qualified right to reinstatement at the end of an economic
strike. 37
A. Economic Strikers
The exertion of economic pressure by employers and unions against each other
to achieve bargaining objectives is an integral part of the collective bargaining process
in the private sector. As the Supreme Court noted twenty-five years ago: "The
presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the
parties, is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have
recognized.' '38
Private employers may lawfully take the initiative in this economic struggle by
implementing a lockout39 of the workers, as long as the purpose is to exert bargaining
pressure and not to discriminate against union employees. 4° More frequently, how-
ever, the union takes the first step in the form of an economic strike41 against its
members' employer, which is a protected concerted activity expressly guaranteed
under the NLRA.42 An employer may respond by filling the jobs vacated by economic
strikers with replacement workers. The conflict between the workers' strike and the
private employer's replacement of strikers represents the pressure and counter-
pressure left almost exclusively to the control of the free play of economic forces. 43
36. R. Gop_,AN, supra note 7, at 339. Some strikes involve a mixture of unfair labor practices and economic factors.
See infra note 70.
37. The employee may lose these rights, however, if she engages in strike violence and misconduct. The level of
misconduct is necessarily more than "minimal," but how much more has caused courts and the NLRB much confusion.
See, e.g., Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1046-47 (1984) (striker's verbal threats, unaccompanied by
physical acts or menacing gestures, not per se protected against discharge; whether there is protection against discharge
depends on whether striker's misconduct, under all the circumstances, "may reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate"
other employees; in determining reinstatement rights of unfair labor practice strikers engaging in misconduct, the NLRB
will not balance severity of employer's unfair labor practice against gravity of striker's misconduct); W.C. McQuaide,
Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 593, 594 (1975) (verbal threats by strikers, "not accompanied by any physical acts or gestures," do
not warrant an employer's refusal to reinstate strikers), enforcement denied in pertinent part, 552 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1977);
Coronet Casuals, Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 304, 305 (1973) (balancing severity of employer's unfair labor practices that
provoked strike against gravity of striker's misconduct); NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 753 (lst Cir. 1954) (holding
that employees' misconduct does not, ipso facto, preclude NLRB from ordering reinstatement if such an order, using a
balancing test, would effectuate purposes of NLRA), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1955). See also infra notes 53 & 69.
38. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960).
39. A lockout is "the withholding of employment by an employer from his employees for the purpose of resisting
their demands or gaining a concession from them." 2 C. MoRm, THE DEvs.oLO LABOR LAw 1034 (2d ed. 1983).
40. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 308-09 (1965).
41. An economic strike is one that is neither caused nor prolonged by an employer's unfair labor practice. See R.
Goe.,Ass, supra note 7, at 339-41; Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720, 725-29 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 888 (1964). Although economic strikes are generally used in attempting to enforce economic demands upon the
employer, this object is not an absolute requirement. See, e.g., Philanz Oldsmobile, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 867 (1962) (strike
designed to persuade employer to agree to consent election deemed an economic strike).
42. Section 7 of the NLRA provides, in part: "Employees shall have the right ... to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection ...." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section 13 of the NLRA is even more explicit:
"Nothing in [the NLRA], except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or
impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right." Id. at § 163.
43. See, e.g., Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 535-36 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n
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The law of replacements in the private sector had its genesis in the famous
dictum of NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.44 in which the Court said that
replacing striking employees with others in an effort to continue business was legal. 45
After employing substitute workers, the employer in Mackay reinstated some but not
all the strikers. The Court declared that although the right to strike was statutory, "it
does not follow that an employer, guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has lost
the right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left vacant by
strikers." ' 46 The Court added that no employer is "bound to discharge those hired to
fill the places of strikers, upon the election of the latter to resume their employment,
in order to create places for them," 47 and that Mackay had not violated the law by
offering replacements permanent employment.
Since the Mackay decision, it has been considered as settled that where the
private employer is "guilty of no act denounced by the statute," it has a right, in order
to keep its plant in operation, to hire permanent replacements for economic strikers,
and thus to deprive such replaced strikers of an immediate right of reinstatement. 48 If
strike replacements are hired for only a temporary period, however, the economic
striker is entitled to reinstatement upon making an unconditional request for re-
employment. 49 The burden is on the employer to show that the replacements were
of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140-41 & n.4, 147 (1976). The employment
of strike replacements is not a recent development in management strategy in the private sector. See Vegelahn v. Guntaer,
167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
44. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
45. Id. at 345. The Court's statement concerning the legality of permanently replacing economic strikers was
unnecessary for the resolution of the issue before the Court. In Mackay, the employer had offered permanent employment
to those who had replaced its economic strikers. Five replacements decided to stay permanently after the conclusion of
the strike. Consequently, there was no work for five strikers when all the strikers returned to work. In deciding which five
strikers not to reinstate, the employer selected those most active in union affairs. Because the NLRB had challenged only
the employer's discriminatory reinstatement policy, the right to replace economic strikers was not an issue before the
Court. On the question presented, the Court agreed with the NLRB that refusing to reinstate those who had been most
active in union affairs violated the NLRA. Id. at 347. The NLRB had reserved the question of the legality of permanently
replacing economic strikers because disposition of that question had not been necessary to the Board's decision
condemning the denial of reinstatement to five strikers because of their union activities. See Mackay Radio & Tel. Co.,
1 N.L.R.B. 201, 216 (1936), enforcement denied, 92 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1937), rev'd, 304 U.S. 333 (1938). For a
vigorous criticism of the Court's dictum, see J. AnysON, VALues AND ASsuMPONS iN A uucAN LABoR LAw 21-24 (1983)
(noting that the brief of the NLRB's General Counsel, apparently relying on a position taken by the NLRB's predecessor,
the National Labor Board, had conceded an employer's right to hire permanent replacements, even though the NLRB had
not decided the issue).
46. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938).
47. Id. at 345-46.
48. See, e.g., 8 NLRB Arm. REP. 32 (1943):
If employees go out on strike for economic reasons and not because of any unfair labor practices on the part of
their employer, the latter may replace them in order to keep his business running, and the strikers thereafter have
no absolute right of reinstatement to their old jobs. After the termination of a strike, however, an employer may
not discriminatorily refuse to reinstate or reemploy the strikers merely because of their union membership or
concerted activity.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
See also, e.g., Vulcan Hart Corp. v. NLRB, 718 F.2d 269, 274 (8th Cir. 1983) ("The legal parameters of an
employer's replacement rights are well defined.").
49. C.H. Guenther & Son v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970). One
commentator has argued for the abolition of the permanent replacement requirement and urged that economic strikers
should have no right to return to their struck jobs once their places have been filled by "regular and substantially equivalent
job holders." Anderson, "Permanent" Replacements of Strikers after Belknap: The Employer's Quandary, 18 J. MAR.
L. REv. 321, 339 (1985).
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permanent. 50
Although a private employer may lawfully refuse an economic striker's request
for reinstatement if she has been permanently replaced prior to termination of the
strike, an economic strike is deemed to be protected activity under section 7 of the
NLRA. 5t Consequently, it is an unfair labor practice for a private employer to
discharge an employee for engaging in an economic strike. 52
The right not to be discharged-even though she is subject to permanent
replacement-is significant to the economic striker for two reasons. First, if an
economic striker's job has not been filled by a permanent replacement, she may apply
for reemployment when the strike ends. Upon receipt of an unconditional request for
reemployment, the employer is required to reinstate the striker if a vacancy exists. 53
Second, even if the economic striker's job has been filled by a permanent
replacement, she is entitled to be placed on a preferential hiring list and given the first
50. NLRB v. Murray Products, Inc., 584 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1978) (The employer failed to prove the
replacements were permanent when they were originally told they were temporary, and the employer's alleged decision
to make them permanent was not communicated to the replacements, to the union, or to the strikers.); Covington Furniture
Mfg. Corp., 212 N.L.R.B. 214, 220 (1974) ("[The employer's hiring offer must include a commitment that the
replacement position is permanent and not merely a temporary expedient subject to cancellation if the employer so
chooses."), enforced, 514 F.2d 995 (6th Cir. 1975).
51. See, e.g., NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S.
221 (1963). In Great Dane, the Supreme Court held that an employer could not lawfully refuse to pay economic strikers
vacation benefits which had accrued under a terminated collective bargaining agreement, while announcing an intent to
pay such benefits to those individuals who had worked on a certain day during the strike. In Erie Resistor, the Court ruled
that an employer could not grant superseniority to permanent replacements in order to assure their continued employment
after the end of the economic strike, even if superseniority had been necessary to induce the replacements to accept
employment.
As Professor Schatzki has noted, these two cases and Mackay create a highly anomalous situation in the private
sector. "Economic strikers are free from the 'terrible' threats of superseniority and better vacation benefits for
strikebreakers, but not from the relatively 'innocuous' threat of losing their jobs entirely for engaging in the strike."
Schataki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer-'"Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 TEx. L.
Ray. 378, 386 (1969).
52. E.g., NLRB v. United States Cold Storage Corp., 203 F.2d 924 (5th Cir.) (employer committed unfair labor
practice by discharging economic strikers prior to filling their jobs), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 818 (1953); see also, NLRB
v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48 (1972) (The employer had to offer unconditional reinstatement to striking
employees whom it had fired before hiring permanent replacements, regardless of whether or not the discharges converted
the strike from an economic to an unfair labor practice strike. The discharges themselves were unfair labor practices
sufficient to justify the NLRB's reinstatement order.).
53. In order to take advantage of their reinstatement rights, unreplaced economic strikers must make an
unconditional application for reinstatement, either personally or through their union. Michael Muldoon Elder, 227
N.L.R.B. 446 (1976); Swearingen Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1978). See Moore Business Forms,
Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 393,408-10 (1976), enforced in relevant part, 574 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1978). A union's offer to return
to work was held to be "unconditional" despite the fact that its members continued to picket the employer's main entrance.
NLRB v. W.C. McQuaide, Inc., 552 F.2d 519, 529 (3d Cir. 1977). The offer must be specific. A union's request for
reinstatement of strikers to "their old jobs or the maximum employment opportunity which the law allows" has been held
not to be sufficiently specific to include job vacancies at a new plant opened by the employerjust prior to the strike. Bryan
Infants Wear Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 1305, 1306 (1978).
In Abilities & Goodwill, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 27 (1979), the NLRB reversed 30 years of precedent by declaring that
discriminatorily discharged strikers are not required to request reinstatement to trigger the employer's back-pay obligation.
Instead, the back-pay obligation is triggered by the discharge, as in the case of a nonstriking dischargee. The First Circuit
denied enforcement of the NLRB's order on other grounds, 612 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1980), but the doctrine was later accepted
in NLRB v. Lyon & Ryan Ford, Inc., 647 F.2d 745, 755-57 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
Regardless of whether replacements have been hired, an employer is not required to offer reinstatement to economic
strikers who have been guilty of serious misconduct during a strike. Overhead Door Corp. v. NLRB, 540 F.2d 878 (7th
Cir. 1976); Jerr-Dan Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 302, 311 (1978). See also NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S.
240 (1939); Local 833, UAW v. NLRB (Kohler Co.), 300 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962);
NLRB v. Ohio Calcium Co., 133 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1943); Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1939).
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opportunity to fill an opening occurring in the future. The right of permanently
replaced economic strikers to preferential status in hiring was first recognized by the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co.5 4 In Fleetwood, an economic strike
caused a reduction in production such that when the strike ended and the strikers
applied for reinstatement, their jobs no longer existed because of the temporary
cutback. When full production resumed two months later, the employer hired new
applicants instead of reinstating the former strikers. The NLRB held that this violated
sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA. 55 In affirming the decision, the Supreme Court
explained that refusing to reinstate economic strikers, if not immediately upon their
application for reinstatement, then at least at some later point when vacancies occur,
has an adverse impact on employee rights. 56 The Court concluded that "[i]f and when
a job for which the striker is qualified becomes available, he is entitled to an offer of
reinstatement. The right can be defeated only if the employer can show 'legitimate
and substantial business justifications."' 5 7
In Laidlaw Corporation,58 the NLRB expanded the reinstatement rights of
permanently replaced economic strikers. The NLRB held that, even if on the date of
application for reinstatement a permanent replacement holds the striker's job, the
employer must later seek out the former striker and give her priority over new
applicants for any comparable job that opens by virtue of the replacement's depar-
ture.59
The Laidlaw rule remains the law,6° although its application has been refined and
elaborated upon in several cases. 6' Reinstatement must be with fully vested employ-
ment benefits, including seniority. 62 It is unlawful to reinstate an economic striker to
54. 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
55. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 425, 429 (1965), enforcement denied, 126 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1966),
vacated, 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
56. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 380 (1967).
57. Id. at 381 (quoting NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967)).
58. 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
59. Id. at 1369. The NLRB defined the status of replaced economic strikers as follows:
[E]conomic strikers who unconditionally apply for reinstatement at a time when their positions are filled by
permanent replacements: (1) remain employees; and (2) are entitled to full reinstatement upon the departure of
replacements unless they have in the meantime acquired regular and substantially equivalent employment, or the
employer can sustain his burden of proof that the failure to offer full reinstatement was for legitimate and
substantial business reasons.
Id. at 1369-70.
60. E.g., Zapex Corp., 235 N.L.R.B. 1237, 1248 (1978); Bralco Metals, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 973, 983 (1977).
But striking employees who engage in unprotected activity by picketing in violation of §§ 8(b)(7)(B) or (C) of the NLRA
are not entitled to reinstatement upon their unconditional application for reinstatement. Claremont Polychemical Corp.,
196 N.L.R.B. 613, 615 (1972); Castle-Pierce Printing Co., Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1293 (1980); NLRB v. Colonial Haven
Nursing Home, 542 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1976).
61. For cases dealing with the issue of who is a permanent replacement, see Cyr Bottle Gas Co., 204 N.L.R.B.
527 (1973), enforced, 497 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1974); Covington Furniture Mfg. Corp., 212 N.L.R.B. 214 (1974),
enforced, 514 F.2d 995 (6th Cir. 1975); H & F Binch Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 720 (1971), enforcement denied in relevant part,
456 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1972). Cases dealing with the issue of which striker has been replaced include Pillows of California,
207 N.L.R.B. 369 (1973), and Lara E. Weber, 194 N.L.R.B. 426 (1971). Reinstatement to a job for which the striker
is not qualified and for which the striker receives no training, followed by the striker's discharge for not meeting production
quotas on the job, violates § 8(a)(3). Elsing Mfg. Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1974).
62. Globe Molded Plastics Co., 204 N.L.R.B. 1041 (1973) (reinstatement without former seniority lacks any
business justification and is illegal even without proof of union animus).
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the same position at a reduced rate of pay. 63 Furthermore, the right of reinstatement
is activated not only by the departure of the precise individual who replaced the
economic striker but also by any job opening for which the former striker is
qualified. 64
The NLRB also has refused to place a time limit on the duration of the
reinstatement rights of economic strikers who have made an unconditional application
for reinstatement. 65 In Brooks Research & Manufacturing, Inc. ,66 the NLRB rejected
the employer's complaints of the burdens that would be imposed if the obligation to
seek out former strikers for job openings continued indefinitely. The NLRB noted that
there were various procedures by which the employer could cope with the burden of
maintaining indefinitely a preferential recall list.67 In addition, the NLRB has
recognized that the duration of reinstatement rights can be limited by a strike
settlement agreement negotiated between the employer and the union.
68
In summary, under the NLRA as it has been construed by the NLRB and the
courts, the economic striker is guaranteed her employee status, although not neces-
sarily her job. The employer is not entitled to treat the exercise of the right to engage
in an economic strike as a form of misconduct and thus as cause for discharge. If and
when the employees decide to end their strike, they are entitled to exercise their right
to return as employees without any discrimination by reason of their strike.
The economic strikers are not guaranteed, however, the right to return to their
jobs since the employer has remained free to operate during the strike. The employer
may hire replacements to fill the jobs of the strikers, and retain these replacements in
the limited number of jobs even when the strikers want to return to work. Although
economic strikers have the right to be kept on a recall list, that may be cold comfort
if the entire unit has been permanently replaced by the employer during the strike.
B. Unfair Labor Practice Strikers
In stark contrast to the reinstatement right of an economic striker, an unfair labor
practice striker's right to reinstatement is absolute in the private sector. 69 If a strike
63. Northwest Oyster Farms, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 872, 876 (1968) (to reinstate to the same position at a reduced
rate of pay is inherently destructive of protected employee rights and is unlawful).
64. Little Rock Airmotive, Inc. v. NLRB, 455 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1972).
65. Brooks Research & Mfg., Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 634 (1973).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 636. Cf. Penn Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. 45 (1978), enforced, 630 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1979) (employer may
not require permanently replaced economic strikers to affirmatively renew their applications for reinstatement within six
months or be removed automatically from the recall list).
68. In United Aircraft Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 382 (197 1), enforced in part sub nom., Lodges 743 & 1746, Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., 534 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976), the NLRB
indicated that it would accept a strike settlement agreement as determining the reinstatement rights of economic strikers
if the period fixed by the agreement for reinstatement of the strikers (1) is not unreasonably short, (2) is not intended to
be discriminatory or misused by either party with the intent of accomplishing a discriminatory objective, (3) was not
insisted upon by the employer to undermine the status of the union, and (4) was the result of good faith bargaining. Id.
at 388. On remand, the Board concluded that any breach by the employer of a strike settlement agreement governing the
rehiring of strikers is ipso facto a violation of § 8(a)(3). United Aircraft Corp., 247 N.L.R.B. 1042 (1980).
69. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956). Of course, strikers who have been guilty of strike
misconduct or who have been discharged "for cause" under § 10(c) of the NLRA need not be reinstated, notwithstanding
the fact that the work stoppage was an unfair labor practice strike. See, e.g., Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B.
1044 (1984) (the reinstatement right of an unfair labor practice striker depends on whether the striker's misconduct, under
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is characterized as an unfair labor practice strike, the employees have an uncondi-
tional right to be reinstated. A strike will be characterized as an unfair labor practice
strike if an unfair labor practice precipitated the strike to any degree, even if it was
only one of multiple causes of the strike. 70 Furthermore, unfair labor practice strikers
are entitled to immediate reinstatement upon their unconditional demand for rein-
statment, even if this requires dismissal of replacements who have been hired to fill
their jobs during the strike.7 1 Even if the unfair labor practice striker's job is no longer
in existence, she is entitled to immediate reinstatement in a substantially equivalent
position. 72
The special status of unfair labor practice strikers is underscored by the fact that
even a general no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement does not waive
the employees' right to strike in response to serious unfair labor practices by the
employer. In Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 73 the employees struck even though
their contract contained a no-strike clause. The strike was clearly precipitated by the
employer's unfair labor practice. Rejecting the employer's argument that the words
"any strike" necessarily include all strikes, the Supreme Court held that a general
no-strike clause does not waive the employees' right to strike in response to unfair
labor practices committed by the employer. In Arlan's Department Store,74 the NLRB
construed Mastro Plastics to mean that only strikes protesting serious unfair labor
practices should be held immune from general no-strike clauses.75
all the circumstances, may reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate other employees). The reinstatement right of strikers
who have engaged in strike misconduct is beyond the scope of this Article. For discussions of this topic, see 2 C. Mosius,
supra note 39, at 1008-09; R. GonRtA,, supra note 7, at 349-53.
70. NLRB v. Crystal Springs Shirt Corp., 637 F.2d 399, 404 (5th Cir. 1981).
A strike may be caused both by a bargaining impasse and by an unfair labor practice. Such a strike is deemed an unfair
labor practice strike unless the employer shows that the strike would have occurred even in the absence of its unfair labor
practice. See NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 236 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1956), rev'd in part on other grounds, 356 U.S. 342
(1958). Similarly, if an employer commits unfair labor practices during an economic strike, a finding of a causal
connection between the employer's conduct and a continuation of the strike will convert the stoppage into an unfair labor
practice strike and strikers who are replaced thereafter will be treated as unfair labor practice strikers. See American
Cyanamid Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1979) (employer's contracting out of work without bargaining with union
converted economic strike to unfair labor practice strike); NLRB v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 574 F.2d 835 (5th Cir.
1978) (discharge of strikers converted economic strike into unfair labor practice strike); Carpenters Dist. Council, 221
N.L.R.B. 876 (1975) (economic strike converted into unfair labor practice strike by employer's bad faith bargaining). See
generally, Stewart, Conversion of Strikes: Economic to Unfair Labor Practice: I & 11, 45 VA. L. REv. 1322, 1327-36
(1959), 49 VA. L. REv. 1297, 1297-1301 (1963) (initial article on strike conversion with update in light of important
subsequent decisions); Comment, Reconversion of Unfair Labor Practice Strikes to Economic Strikes, 64 GEo. L.J. 1143
(1976).
71. E.g., George Banta Co. v. NLRB, 604 F.2d 830, 832 n.1 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980);
NLRB v. Efco Mfg. Co., 227 F.2d 675 (Ist Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007 (1956); NLRB v. Remington Rand,
Inc., 130 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1942). Displaced striker replacements may have civil causes of action for breach of contract
and misrepresentation against an employer who has promised them permanent employment. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale,
463 U.S. 491 (1983), discussed infra note 88.
72. See, e.g., Airport Parking Management, 264 N.L.R.B. 5, 14 (1982); Inta-Roto, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 764, 773
(1980); Rogers Mfg. Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 1264, 1269 (1972).
73. 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
74. 133 N.L.R.B. 802 (1961).
75. Id. at 807. Member Fanning dissented, taking the position that all unfair labor practices are serious. Id. at 814
(Fanning, M., dissenting). Although the distinction between "serious" and "non-serious" unfair labor practices is
generally followed, the courts have not always agreed on what constitutes a "serious" unfair labor practice. See Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 1242, 1245-48 (7th Cir. 1981); Dow Chemical Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1979),
enforcement denied, 636 F.2d 1352 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981).
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In summary, unfair labor practice strikers possess more expansive reinstatement
rights than economic strikers in the private sector. 76 Neither the economic striker nor
the unfair labor practice striker may be discharged. 77 The employer, however, may
seek to continue operating during the strike by hiring permanent replacements or
temporary replacements-such as supervisors, relatives, or company employees
outside the bargaining unit-who only serve pending the termination of the strike. In
the case of the unfair labor practice striker who makes an unconditional request for
reinstatement, the employer must reinstate the striker to her original position and oust
the replacement. 78 In contrast, the employer may permanently replace the economic
striker and is under no obligation to reinstate her immediately or to oust the permanent
replacement. 79 The NLRB and the courts have narrowed the distinction between
economic strikers and unfair labor practice strikers, however, by deciding that the
economic striker is entitled, upon unconditional application, to preferential reinstate-
ment status even though her position is not available on the date of her application for
reinstatement due to temporary economic retrenchment or to the presence of a
permanent replacement.
C. A Critique of Replacement Rights in the Private Sector
Private sector labor rulings concerning the rights of strikers have been subjected
to vigorous scholarly criticism.80 Some commentators have questioned the distinction
between unfair labor practice strikes and economic strikes and the resulting grant of
greater reinstatement rights to unfair labor practice strikers.8t In addition, the wisdom
of the Mackay decision permitting employers to permanently replace economic
strikers has been attacked because of its chilling effect upon workers' right to strike
and its capricious effects in practice. 82
76. See generally Note, Replacement of Workers During Strikes, 75 Yua. L.J. 630, 639-41 (1966).
77. NLRB v. international Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48 (1972).
78. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956).
79. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
80. See, e.g., J. AItzso, supra note 45, at 19-34; Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the
Prospectsfor Union Representation, 98 HARv. L. REv. 351, 387-94 (1984); Janes, The Illusion ofPermanencyfor Mackay
Doctrine Replacement Workers, 54 TEx. L. REv. 126 (1975); Gillespie, The Mackay Doctrine and the Myth of Business
Necessity, 50 TEx. L. REv. 782 (1972); Schatzki, supra note 51, at 382-92; Boudin, The Rights of Strikers, 35 Iai. L.
REv. 817, 830-32 (1941); Note, supra note 76.
81. See, e.g., Gillespie, supra note 80, at 785; Note, supra note 76, at 639-41; see generally Stewart, supra note
70. See infra text accompanying notes 83-93.
82. See authorities cited in note 80 supra; see infra text accompanying notes 94-103. The Mackay doctrine,
however, has been explained on two grounds. Fst, the doctrine may be explained as a balancing of economic power.
The only rational explanation for the Mackay doctrine is based on the concept of balancing economic weapons
of the parties engaged in the collective-bargaining battle. To allow the union to strike to accomplish its economic
ends and then to prevent the employer from carrying on his business in any meaningful fashion by outlawing
all permanent replacements would place the balance of power too heavily in the hands of the union.
Schatzki, The Employer's Unilateral Act-A Per Se Violation--Sometimes, 44 TEx. L. Rev. 470, 487-88 (1966).
Second, the doctrine may be explained as a protection of property rights: "Management has the right to attempt to
continue the operation of its business when subjected to an economic strike. While the Mackay Court did not develop the
origin of this right, it clearly flows from the 'right of property' guaranteed under both federal and state constitutions."
Unkovic & Harty, Management's Legal Problems in Continuing Plant Operations During an Economic Strike Under
Federal and Pennsylvania Law, 67 DicK. L. REv. 63, 63 (1962) (footnotes omitted).
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The difference in the right to reinstatement between economic strikers and unfair
labor practice strikers creates painful problems in practice, particularly for an
employer who has been successful in defeating a strike by hiring permanent replace-
ments. When the union decides to end the strike and the strikers make an uncondi-
tional offer to return to work, the employer may be faced with a dilemma. 83 If the
strike was purely economic, the employer can refuse to reinstate those who have been
permanently replaced. 84 If the employer committed any unfair labor practices which
contributed to causing the strike, then it must reinstate the strikers even though this
means dismissing replacements; 85 refusal to reinstate renders the employer liable for
full back pay. 86 Even though the strike was economic in its inception, it may be
converted by any unfair labor practice which prolongs the strike. 87 Again, the
employer will be liable for back pay if it refuses to reinstate a striker who was replaced
after the unfair labor practice. 88
The difficulty is that at the time the strikers offer to return to work, the employer
may not know whether they are economic strikers or unfair labor practice strikers.
Determination of whether the employer has committed an unfair labor practice and
whether that practice has contributed to causing or prolonging a strike may not be
made until months later. The employer denies reinstatement at the peril of costly back
pay awards. 89 The union may file unfair labor practice charges, including claims of
refusal to bargain in good faith, in order to protect any potential rights of the strikers
to reinstatement and to remind the employer of its peril. 9° Consequently, a reinstate-
83. One commentator has labeled the employer's dilemma a "Catch-22." Anderson, supra note 49, at 321. The
distinction between the rights of economic and unfair labor practice strikers also poses a very serious dilemma for
employees who face a potentially permanent job loss should they erroneously predict that the Board will find that their
employer has committed an unfair labor practice.
84. See supra text accompanying note 48.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
86. See Maurice Embroidery Works, Inc., 111 N.L.R.B. 1143, 1160 (1955).
87. See supra note 70.
88. See American Cyanamid Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 1316, 1325 (1978), enforced, 592 F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1979).
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983), further complicates the
employer's position. In Belknap, the employer presented each strike replacement with a statement that he or she had been
employed as a "regular full-time permanent replacement." Id. at 494-95. The employer settled an unfair labor practice
complaint based upon the union's charge against it by allowing the strikers to return to work, which resulted in the
dismissal of the replacements. Id. at 496. The Court held that the dismissed replacements were free to pursue state law
contract and tort claims against the employer for breach of its guarantee of permanent replacement. Id. at 512.
If unfair labor practice strikers and economic strikers were treated similarly, however, the employer could avoid this
dilemma because it would know at the time of replacement the kind of representations it could make without guessing
whether the strikers are engaging in an economic or unfair labor practice strike. The Court in Belknap suggested that an
employer could avoid liability to strike replacements under current law by promising the replacements "permanent
employment, subject only to settlement with its employees' union and to a Board unfair labor practice order directing
reinstatement of strikers. ... Id. at 503.
89. See, e.g., Gillespie, supra note 80, at 785:
The line between the two types of disputes may be unclear, or an economic strike may be converted in midstream
into an unfair labor practice strike. Working under these inconsistent standards, both management and union
may have difficulties determining their respective rights. If management mistakenly assumes it faces an
economic strike and hires permanent replacements, or if an economic strike turns into an unfair labor practice
strike, management may incur heavy back pay costs. If employees strike against unfair labor practices but the
NLRB disagrees and classifies them as economic strikers, they may find themselves permanently displaced.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
90. See J. A esoN, supra note 45, at 187-88 n.29 ("Many 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain cases, for instance, are fought
to protect the status of replaced strikers rather than for the often minimal vindicatory value of a cease-and-desist order.").
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ment rule which would apply equally to unfair labor practice and economic strikers
would be desirable. 9t
Furthermore, neither the NLRB nor the courts have explained why the unfair
labor practice striker should be entitled to greater protection than the economic striker.
An unfair labor practice strike is an attempt by the employees to resolve their dispute
with their employer by resorting to self-help. A legal procedure exists, however, for
resolving such disputes. 92 In contrast, economic strikers must resort to self-help
because they have no legal procedure for forcing their employer to acquiesce in their
bargaining demands. Therefore, it seems anomalous to provide greater protection for
unfair labor practice strikers. 93
The Mackay doctrine has been directly criticized on several other fronts. Some
commentators criticize the doctrine for curtailing a right that the NLRA explicitly
grants to employees-the right to strike. 94 The Mackay rule may render the right to
strike illusory because workers may not be willing to risk permanent loss of
employment in order to exercise this statutorily protected right. Thus, it has been
suggested that the balance reached in Mackay between employees' section 7 rights
and the employer's interest in continuing operations improperly provides management
with a weapon sufficient to eliminate union supporters from the workplace.
95
Furthermore, replacement workers undermine the union's status as the workers'
bargaining representative because permanent replacements are likely to be anti-union
and may vote in decertification elections during a strike. 96
91. At least one commentator has argued that abolishing the Mackay doctrine in favor of a rule that allows the
employer to hire only temporary replacements is the only way to ensure uniform treatment of strikers. Note, supra note
76, at 639-41.
92. Section 10 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982), empowers the NLRB to determine whether an alleged unfair
labor practice has occurred and "to take such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the policies of [the
NLRA]. ... Id. § 160(c).
93. On the other hand, it could be argued that because the employer's violation of the statute caused or prolonged
the strike, the employer should not be permitted any countermeasures at all to defeat the strike, including the hiring of
temporary replacements to continue operations.
94. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. See. e.g., J. An-soN-, supra note 45, at 179 ("The [Mackay] doctrine
obviously mocks the protection of the right to strike .... "); Note, supra note 76, at 634:
Section 13 of the [NLRA] expressly refers to labor's "right to strike." Other sections of the [NLRA] reinforce
this fundamental guarantee. But its full exercise is restrained by permanent replacement. At times, even the
threat of such replacement may prevent the calling of a work stoppage or cause a striking union to surrender to
management's demands. For the strike may result in the permanent loss of members' jobs and the elimination
of pension, seniority or other rights acquired through previous service.
Id. (footnote omitted).
95. Gillespie, supra note 80, at 783-87. See also J. Arr'so, supra note 45, at 24-28; Schatzki, supra note 51,
at 385; Note, supra note 76, at 634, 639.
96. Employees who desire to oust an incumbent union are permitted to seek an election to decertify the union. 29
U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii) (1982). An economic striker who has been permanently replaced is generally entitled to vote
in a decertification election conducted within 12 months of the start of the strike. Id. § 159(c)(3). A permanent replacement
may vote during a decertification election if she satisfies the usual eligibility requirements-i.e., she is employed on the
date of the election and, if the strike predates the election order, also on the customary payroll date. A permanent
replacement may vote even though the strike began after the election was ordered. Macy's Missouri-Kansas Div., 173
N.L.R.B. 1500 (1969). In contrast, unfair labor practice strikers are entitled to vote regardless of the duration of the strike,
and their replacements are never permitted to vote. Rivoli Mills, Inc., 104 N.L.R.B. 169, 182-83 (1953), enforced per
curiam, 212 F.2d 792 (6th Cir. 1954). See generally Note, Right of Economic Strikers to Vote in NLRB Elections, 12
Symcuss L. REv. 218, 218-20 (1960); 1 C. Mossus, supra note 39, at 388-89.
Several commentators have noted the opportunity this gives the employer to oust the union. See e.g., Note, supra
note 76, at 634 ("An employer can hire, and characterize as 'permanent,' a sufficient number of strikebreakers to force
the union's decertification. This weapon gives him control over the decision whether or not his plant will be unionized
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As an alternative to abolishing the Mackay rule, some commentators propose
requiring the employer to prove that it had no choice but to hire permanent
replacements. 97 The basic principle of Mackay, that an employer can do business only
by offering permanent employment to replacement workers, is open to serious
question.98 The employer has several alternatives to combat the strike without hiring
permanent replacements. These include hiring temporary replacement workers, 99
shutting down, reducing the labor force, locking out, purchasing strike insurance, and
submitting to binding arbitration.l°00
Some authors argue that the Mackay rule is arbitrary and capricious in prac-
tice.10 1 When unemployment is low, replacements may not be available, but when
community unemployment is high, the employer can more easily replace strikers. The
right to replace may be no right at all in a union-oriented community with little
unemployment, but may break a strike in a city where the labor movement is weak
and unemployment is high.' 0 2 As a practical matter, the weakest unions and the least
skilled workers suffer most from the permanent replacement weapon. 103
by allowing him to nullify the strikers' choice of a bargaining representative."); Gillespie, supra note 80, at 786 ("[Ihe
permanent replacement doctrine . . . facilitates manipulation of the election process to remove the union."); J. Ausos,
supra note 45, at 27 ("[T he replacement of a substantial number of strikers can predictably result in the destruction of
the union's representational status.").
97. See Gillespie, supra note 80, at 791-95 (listing factors a court should consider in determining whether the
employer acted soundly); see also Janes, supra note 80, at 150.
98. See Schatzki, supra note 51, at 385. But see Unkovic & Harty, supra note 82, at 70 & n.39 (arguing that using
temporary replacement workers is economically inefficient).
99. See Schatzki, supra note 51, at 392. In some pro-union communities, however, where little unemployment
exists and the citizenry is hostile to strikebreakers, the employer may not be able to hire temporary replacements. Gillespie,
supra note 80, at 789. In that situation, the employer should have to demonstrate a legitimate and substantial business
justification for hiring permanent replacements. Id. at 796-97. Certain seasonal occupations, for example, may justify the
need to hire permanent workers. Id. at 795.
100. See Gillespie, supra note 80, at 790-91.
101. See id. at 788-89:
Practical considerations, however, may in many instances prevent the employer from using [permanent
replacements]. Permanent replacements may not be available in a given locality if employment is full, if the
work is skilled, or if the community is union-oriented and hostile to strikebreakers. The employer may not be
able to have deliveries or pickups made because of picketing on his premises, or he may be dissuaded from using
the device for fear of the bitterness or violence that could result. Because replacements are least available in
large, skilled industry, the Mackay doctrine functions, in a sense, as a subsidy to small business.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Schatzki, supra note 82, at 488; Schatzki, supra note 51, at 384; Weiler, supra note 80,
at 394; Note, supra note 76, at 630. See also Meltzer, Single-Employer and Multi-Employer Lockouts Under the
Taft-Hartley Act, 24 U. Cm. L. Rav. 70, 79 (1956) ("The right to replace is more often than not a purely paper right either
because of lack of qualified replacements or because its exercise would produce bitterness, if not bloodshed.").
102. See authorities cited in note 101 supra.
On the other hand, in establishing a market-based system of collective bargaining in which the government is to play
no role in dictating terms and conditions of employment, Congress apparently intended for these kinds of local economic
factors to play a greater role in determining the efficacy of a strike than matters arguably more relevant to the labor dispute.
103. See, e.g., Gillespie, supra note 80, at 784 ("Permanent replacement takes its heaviest toll from weak unions,
while against strong unions it has proved of little utility."); Schatzki, supra note 51, at 384. ("The real effect of the
doctrine is to give greater strength to those employers who least need it, and to permit those employers to rid themselves
of union employees and the union."); J. A'o , supra note 45, at 28 ("[T]he Mackay doctrine may well harm those
employees in the weakest bargaining position.") (footnote omitted).
The discharge-replacement distinction of the Mackay rule is also subject to criticism. In the context of an employee's
refusal to cross a picket line at another's place of business, the Supreme Court has condemned the discharge-replacement
distinction:
The distinction between discharge and replacement in this context seems to us as unrealistic and unfounded in
law as the Court of Appeals found it. This application of the distinction is not sanctioned by [Mackay]. It is not
based on any difference in effect upon the employee. And there is no finding that he was not replaced either by
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Although the Mackay rule is firmly rooted in private sector labor law, t° 4 in view
of the substantial scholarly criticism directed at permitting permanent strike replace-
ments, 10 5 the SERB and the courts should hesitate before superimposing the Mackay
doctrine on the Ohio public sector.
D. The Impact of Private Sector Labor Rulings on Public Sector Labor Law
In deciding whether the precedents under the NLRA concerning the replacement
of strikers should be superimposed upon the legislative scheme devised by the Ohio
General Assembly, reflection on the role private sector case law should play in the
development of public sector labor law is instructive.1 06 Collective bargaining is a
relatively new concept in the public sector'0 7 with a paucity of decisions governing
key issues. 108 Because public sector labor relations are regulated by individual state
or local statutes, executive orders, and attorney general opinions, the case law in any
jurisdiction may be limited or nonexistent. Furthermore, applicability of case law
among different jurisdictions may be restricted because state collective bargaining
laws vary widely.
Precedent in the private sector is extensive, however, since the NLRA has been
interpreted through a centralized agency, the NLRB, for more than fifty years.
Consequently, several public sector tribunals have relied on private sector precedents
because the statutory language in both sectors often coincides.1t 9 When parallel
a new employee or by transfer of duties to some nonobjecting employee, as would appear necessary if the
respondent were to maintain the operation. Substantive rights and duties in the field of labor-management do
not depend on verbal ritual reminiscent of medieval real property law.
NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 75 (1953). The Court, however, has not questioned the
discharge-replacement distinction in the economic strike context. The terminology of the employment severance
(discharge or replacement) and the chronological order of the severance and the replacement still control in the economic
strike context. Professor Weiler has noted, however, that "the employee may be excused for not perceiving a practical
difference [between permanent replacement and discharge] as far as his rights under section 7 are concerned." Weiler,
supra note 80, at 390 (footnote omitted).
104. There is no reason to believe that the permanent replacement rule of Mackay will be abandoned in the private
sector. In NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 379 (1967), the Court, in dictum, expressly endorsed Mackay.
105. "[Flew rules of American labor law have been as heavily criticized as the legality of hiring permanent strike
replacements." Weiler, supra note 80, at 393.
106. See generally Edwards, The Impact of Private Sector Principles in the Public Sector: Bargaining Rights for
Supervisors and the Duty to Bargain, in UoN PowR AND PuBuc Poucy 51 (D. Lipskey, ed. 1975).
107. The first statute extending some bargaining rights to public employees was not enacted until 1957. See Act of
Apr. 27, 1957, ch. 789, § 1, 1957 Minn. Laws 1073 (codified as amended at MN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179A.01-.25 (West
Supp. 1985)). In 1962, President Kennedy's Executive Order 10988 recognized that federal employees have the right to
join or not to join unions without fear of reprisal, that agreements providing for grievance procedures may be negotiated,
and that a code of fair labor practices and standards of conduct for the unions could be prepared. See Exec. Order No.
10988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1962), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 631 (1964). It was not until the 1960s that public sector collective
bargaining of the sort characteristic of the private sector existed except in a few isolated situations. See Note, Project:
Collective Bargaining and Politics in Public Employment, 19 UCLA L. Rsv. 887, 896-98 (1972). Of course, the roots
of public sector unionism run deep, and there were notorious earlier union activities, such as the Boston police strike in
1919. See generally id.; S. Smto, GovOUerT As E,to.R (1948); D. Zisearo, 1000 STuramS oF GovEa , 5NI E.'r i.ovrs
(1940); W. HAar, CouacvE BAROaNGA NmTHE FEhORAI. Cnr. SERvicEs (1961).
108. For example, two prominent publishers of public sector cases have published fewer than ten bound volumes
each. The National Public Employee Reporter series consists of six bound volumes and the CCH Public Bargaining Cases
series consists of five volumes.
109. See, e.g., Fire Fighters Union, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 526 P.2d 971, 116 Cal. Rptr.
507 (1974); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 391 Mich. 44, 214 N.W.2d 803 (1974); Kerrigan v. City
of Boston, 361 Mass. 24,278 N.E.2d 387 (1972). See also Drachman & Ambash, Is Looking Up Case Precedent in Other
Jurisdictions Worthwhile in Public SectorLaborRelations: A Management Perspective, 6 J. L. & EDuc. 209 (1977); Kahn,
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statutory language exists, the private sector precedents may provide analogous
authority. Blind deference is unwarranted, however, unless the legislature intended
the statute to be so construed." 0
Although the private sector precedents offer some guidance, public sector issues
should not be interpreted solely by reference to the private sector."' In fact,
Pennsylvania courts have held that it is necessary to consider "the distinctions that
Is Looking Up Case Precedent in Other Jurisdictions Worthwhile in Public Sector Labor Relations: The Perspective of
a Neutral, 6 J. L. & Enuc. 221, 225-27 (1977).
110. For example, the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act provides that the Agricultural Labor Relations
Board "shall follow applicable precedents of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended." CAL. LAB. CoDs § 1148
(West Supp. 1985). In contrast, the PECBL contains no such instruction. Furthermore, State Representative Clifton
Skeen, the chief House sponsor of the PECBL and the Chairman of the Ohio House Subcommittee on Commerce and
Labor, in reference to the PECBL declared, "I'm fairly familiar with the National Labor Relations Act. There may be
some similarities, but I don't think this bill is in any way modeled after that." United Press International, June 2, 1983,
cited in White, Kaplan & Hawkins, supra note 10, at 5. This underscores the caution one should exercise before imposing
private sector rulings on Ohio's public sector.
111. As one commentator has noted:
Mhe preoccupation with the private sector system is unfortunate. Simply to import the private sector bargaining
regime into the public sector would be to neglect the special role of the public employer as representative of the
public interest. Moreover, even in the private sector, the NLRA model has not proved to be the panacea for
labor-management problems that it once promised to be. Reliance on private sector prototypes, therefore, may
transplant to the public sector the weaknesses as well as the strengths of a long-entrenched system.
Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 Hsv. L. REv. 1611, 1681 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
There are two distinctions between the public and private sectors that must be kept in mind when using private sector
precedents to construe public sector collective bargaining laws. First, unlike private business, government cannot go out
of business. But see Chapter 9 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-46 (1982) (permitting municipal
employers to resort to financial reorganization in bankruptcy under standards and procedures that closely parallel those
provided under Chapter 11 for private employers). See also Note, Executory Labor Contracts and Municipal Bankruptcy,
85 Ys.s L.J. 957, 958 n.7 (1976) (applying Chapter I 1 standards to interpret Chapter 9); Supreme Court Ruling on
Bankrupt Employer's Labor Contract May Apply to Public Sector, 22 Gov'T EMvL. RL. REP. (BNA) 470 (Mar. 5, 1984)
(suggesting that public employers are reluctant to submit the conduct of government affairs to federal bankruptcy court
supervision); San Jose School District Files for Bankruptcy; Seeks to Toss Out Pacts, 21 Gov'T E.mL. REL. REP. (BNA)
1579, 1580 (Aug. 1, 1983) (in 1983, the San Jose School District was the first governmental entity to file for bankruptcy
in 40 years); San Jose Schools Seek Dismissal of Bankruptcy Case Under Pacts, 22 Gov'T E.i,. REL. REP. (BNA) 1081
(June 4, 1984) (the San Jose School District's bankruptcy petition was dismissed with the school board voluntarily
agreeing to restore wage cuts). Government services are generally required by law because they are viewed as vital to
citizens by their elected representatives. No matter how many costly concessions might be made at the bargaining table,
the government agency cannot, generally, go out of business. In contrast, in the private sector a company will usually cease
to exist if it conducts its labor negotiations in an irresponsible fashion. Thus, the market place is the ultimate curb to wrong
decisions in the private sector but no similar economic force may exist for government decisions.
Second, government services are generally essential and monopolistic. When a government agency is closed down
temporarily by a strike, the citizens may have no place else to turn for essential government services. In the private sector,
however, if one company producing shoes is closed by a strike, the consumer simply buys from another company. When
a government agency is faced with a shutdown due to a strike by its employees, however, considerable political pressure
may be generated to keep services operating. Consequently, the agency is faced with two choices: (1) refuse to concede
to union demands and run the risk of not delivering essential services to citizens, or (2) concede to union demands, thus
imposing a greater burden on taxpayers.
Numerous scholars have also argued that the theoretical distinctions between the public and private sectors preclude
the possibility of transplanting private sector policies and procedures to the public sector. See, e.g., H. WVEUJNOTo. & R.
Werrm, THE UNioNs AmD THE Cms 7-32 (1971); Corbett, Determining the Scope of Public Sector Collective Bargaining:
A New Look Via a Balancing Formula, 40 Mor. L. Rsv. 231, 253-57 (1979); Kilberg, Appropriate Subjects for
Bargaining in Local Government Labor Relations, 30 MD. L. REv. 179, 184-91 (1970); Petro, Sovereignty and
Compulsory Public-Sector Bargaining, 10 VAE FoResT L. Rev. 25, 165 (1974). But see Summers, Public Employee
Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 Yma.E L.J. 1156, 1156-57 (1974) (noting that "it does not follow from the
proposition that collective bargaining in the public and private sectors is different .. . that practices in the private sector
cannot be transplanted to the public sector").
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necessarily must exist between legislation primarily directed to the private sector and
that for public employees.""t2
In view of the differences between private and public employment 1 3 and the
dual nature of government as both employer and governor,11 4 the SERB and the courts
should be cautious in using private sector precedents to construe the PECBL." 5
Where private sector precedents have been as widely criticized as the Mackay
doctrine, the SERB and the courts should be even more reluctant to superimpose
private sector doctrine upon the regulatory scheme devised by the Ohio General
Assembly. Although private sector law may offer some guidance, it does not provide
the definitive answer to whether Ohio public employers may permanently replace
economic strikers. The limited application of private sector rulings on striker replace-
ments to the public sector is underscored by the substantial differences between
private and public sector strikes described in the next section.
E. The Distinctions Between Private and Public Sector Strikes
Before importing the private sector law of strike replacements into the Ohio
public sector, a comparison of private and public sector strikes is appropriate to
determine whether public employers have a greater or lesser claim to the potent
weapon of replacement than do their private sector counterparts."16
112. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 499, 337 A.2d 262, 264
(1975). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also stated:
We emphasize that we are not suggesting that the experience gained in the private sector is of no value here,
rather we are stressing that analogies have limited application and the experiences gained in the private
employment sector will not necessarily provide an infallible basis for a monolithic model for public employment.
Id. at 500, 337 A.2d at 264-65 (footnote omitted). See also Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. AFSCME, 22 Pa.
Commw. 376, 348 A.2d 921 (1975); Borough of Wilkinsburg v. Sanitation Dep't, 463 Pa. 521, 525 n.5, 345 A.2d 641,
643 n.5 (1975); Lullo v. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 1066, 55 N.J. 409, 440, 262 A.2d 681, 698 (1970) (noting
that "the process of collective bargaining as understood in the private employment sector cannot be transplanted into the
public service").
113. See supra note I11.
114. See infra note 144.
115. It appears that the dominance of the NLRA model of collective bargaining in the public sector is giving way
to approaches that attempt to respond to the duality of government's identity as both employer and governor. Compare
Mum. STAT. ANN. § 179A.01 (West Supp. 1985) ("[U]nique approaches to . . . resolutions of disputes between public
employees and employers are necessary.") with Act of May 26, 1965, ch. 839, § 179.50, 1965 Minn. Laws 1554,
1554-55 ("[IThe paramount interest of the public and the nature of govemmental processes make it necessary to impose
special limitations upon public employment.") (repealed 1971).
A good example of experimentation can be found in several states' approaches to defining bargaining units. See, e.g.,
MtNEsorA IEotStAnVE COM.0'N o, ELmoYEE RELAioNS, RESEAR H REPORT o.N THE BARGo'.NG UNrr DERmINATioNs (1979);
Rock, The Appropriate Unit Question in the Public Service: The Problem of Proliferation, 67 MicI. L. REv. 1001 (1969);
Shaw & Clark, Determination of Appropriate Bargaining Units in the Public Sector: Legal and Practical Problems, 51
OR. L. Rsv. 151 (1971).
116. This comparison of private and public sector strikes draws extensively upon the works of Professors Harry
Wellington and Ralph Winter. See H. WE.UNGTON & R. Wemrn, supra note 111; Wellington & Winter, Structuring
Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 79 YALE L.J. 805, 857-61 (1970); Wellington & Winter, The Limits of
Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YAt. L.J. 1107 (1969). During the late 1960s and early 1970s,
Wellington and Winter examined the applicability of private sector collective bargaining practices to the public sector and
argued that "all the collective bargaining practices developed in the private sector" should not be "mindlessly import[ed]
into the public sector." H. Wami -ro4 & R. Werm, supra note 111, at 202. For criticisms of their arguments, see Cohen,
Does Public Employee Unionism Diminish Democracy?, 32 INDUS. & LAB. Ra.: REv. 189 (1979). For a discussion of the
theoretical distinctions between private sector and public sector employment, see supra note Il1.
656 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:639
The typical public employee strike differs from the typical private sector strike
in that the strike deprives members of the general public of a service which they
cannot obtain from any other source, at least during the temporary period of the strike.
When governments provide public goods, they normally do so as a monopoly, either
as a legal or a practical matter.1 17 Strikes by public sector employees result in an
interruption of services to the community. The failure to satisfy the public need for
services produces political pressure on public employers. 118 The striking union's
objective is to generate sufficient discomfort among the general public that pressure
will mount on the politicians to settle the bargaining dispute. 19 Inflicting political
harm on a public employer is the ultimate lever by which a public employee union
extracts concessions in collective bargaining. 120
There are varying degrees of harm inflicted by any such interruption of public
services. Some services are critical, such as police and firefighters; some are trivial,
such as state lottery commission workers. On the whole, however, the services
rendered by public employees are important. 12 1 Regardless of how these public
services are characterized, strikes by each of these groups result in similar popular
reaction. The public has grown accustomed to these services, it feels it needs them,
and it has paid for them. Consequently, the public feels deeply aggrieved when they
are interrupted. Thus, the amount of political force that a public employee union can
wield may be enormous. Emotions are fanned by the media, a crisis atmosphere
develops, and powerful pressure surges up on the politicians-who, after all, are
elected by and are accountable to the general public-to settle the strike quickly and
without much concern about the cost. 122
117. H. WEtUNGrTON & R. W!in, supra note I 1l, at 18 ("'There usually are not close substitutes for the products
and services provided by government . ). This may also hold true in the private sector in some situations; for
example, local telephone service.
118. Id. at 25-26 ("The public employee strike['s] ...sole purpose is to exert political pressure on municipal
officials.").
119. Id. at 25 ("[B]ecause strikes in public employment disrupt important services, a large part of a mayor's political
constituency will, in many cases, press for a quick end to the strike with little concern for the cost of settlement.").
120. In addition, public employee unions have a self-help measure legally available to them in attempting to inhibit
the exercise of the employer's right to operate during a strike. This public employee union countermeasure is the right to
initiate and fund a political campaign to oust the public officials with ultimate responsibility for management's bargaining
position. See infra note 122. As a practical matter, unions in the private sector do not have this self-help measure available
because a proxy contest to oust incumbent management because of its collective bargaining position is not likely to be
successful.
121. Examples of public employees that perform important services include teachers, sanitation workers, and transit
workers.
122. From a political standpoint, it may be possible to bury these costs in public accounts in such a way that they
will haunt only the successors of the current officeholders. See H. WVUeso'oN & R. W\nmER, supra note 111, at 27.
Another argument that public employee unions have greater bargaining clout than their private sector counterparts
is that public sector employees, as citizens, already have a voice in workplace decisionmaking through customary political
channels. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 228-29 (1977); Township of W. Windsor v. Pub.
Employment Relations Comm'n, 78 N.J. 98, 111-12, 393 A.2d 255, 261 (1978); Dalton, A Theory of the Organization
of State and Local Government Employees, 3 J. LAB. RssARcH 163, 164-65 (1982) (asserting that public employees
participate in hiring their own employer through voting); Summers, supra note 111, at 1160.
Some commentators have also argued that public employees organize their lobbying and voting efforts more
effectively than do members of the general public. See, e.g., Bellante & Long, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking
Society: The Case of Public Employees and their Unions, 2 J. LAB. RESEAR cH 1, 4 (1981); Bush & Denzau, The Voting
Behavior of Bureaucrats and Public Sector Growth, in BunDers AND BuRsAucRArs: TnE SOURCES OF GoVEsssmurr GROWTH 90
(T. Borcherding ed. 1977); Note, supra note 107, at 888-92, 921-23, 947-48.
REPLACING PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMIC STRIKERS
In contrast, the private sector unions' objective is to inflict economic harm on
their employers by causing a diminution in revenues through the cessation of
production. Private sector unions who wield a great deal of bargaining power can
inflict severe economic losses on their employers in a strike. These unions are forced
to be moderate in the use of the strike weapon, however, because both the employer
and the employees are ultimately exposed to the discipline of the market. 123 If the
union wins unduly high wage levels for its current members, that victory increases the
price of the employer's goods or services, in turn reducing the level of consumer
demand. Customers will switch to less expensive substitutes, either nonunion pro-
ducers of the same good or alternative products performing essentially the same
function. The reduction in demand will cause the employer to substitute capital-
intensive technology which is now less expensive than the cost of labor at higher wage
levels. Ultimately, the unionized employees face the prospect of loss of work, and
their union the loss of membership strength and dues, which should induce moder-
ation by private sector unions in the pursuit of higher and higher wage levels. 124
At first blush, the typical private sector unions seem to have substantially less
bargaining clout than do public employee unions. The economic calculus confronting
the typical public sector union is certainly much different. Unlike most consumer
goods, the demand for government services is often highly inelastic. No matter how
expensive policing, firefighting, hospital care, or education becomes, the general
public usually feels that it must maintain at least the level of service to which it has
become accustomed. The cost of wage settlements can be buried in larger government
budgets which are paid by general taxes and often subsidized by higher levels of
government. Thus a public union that wins a substantial pay raise will not see an
immediate and visible increase in the price of the service that its members provide,
nor will that victory generate perceived consumer resistance. Moreover, because the
government often has a monopoly on that service, the consumers have nowhere else
to go. The services that governments provide are rarely capable of delivery by
labor-saving technology; even if they are, layoffs of civil servants are always touchy
events.125 The convergence of all these factors makes it seem that public employee
unions do not face the same tradeoff between higher wages and unemployment for
their members as do their private sector counterparts.
123. Furthermore, the force of the post-1979 economic decline has combined with such factors as deregulation,
foreign imports, and nonunion competition to reduce the economic clout of many private sector unions. These competitive
influences are generally less influential in public employment. Additionally, private employers have a weapon that public
employers lack. Although private employers can relocate to nonunion jurisdictions, the government of Cleveland cannot
relocate to South Carolina or Hong Kong.
124. H. WULm.TON & R. wnnm, supra note 111, at 15-17.
125. See id. at 17-21.
Although government is relatively insulated from competition, it is possible to use private contractors to perform work
previously done by public employees. For example, private firms can be hired to collect garbage, perform maintenance,
or even nin fire departments. See Willimantic, Conn., Fire Personnel Take Cuts to Beat Out Private Firm, 21 Gov'T ENL.
RE.. Rn. (BNA) 863 (Apr. 18, 1983) (firefighters agreed to concessions to avoid the contracting out of their services).
The tax laws, however, give a cost advantage to public agencies over private firms which makes contracting out less
attractive than it might seem at first blush. For example, a private garbage collecting firm must pay federal and state
income taxes while a public agency performing the same service does not. Likewise, a private garbage collector must
borrow at market interest rates to finance purchases of capital equipment while a public agency-because of the tax laws'
exemption of interest on securities issued by state and local governments--can pay below-market rates.
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If that were the entire story of the difference between private and public sector
strikes, then it could reasonably be concluded that public employers need more
weapons to counter a strike than do their private sector counterparts in order to avoid
severe wage inflation in the public work force. That, however, is not the entire picture
of the relative strength of strikes in the public and private sectors. First, there are real
economic costs to public employees if they decide to strike rather than take their
employer's last offer: they will be without a paycheck for the duration of the strike.
On the other hand, there are generally no economic costs to the public employer when
its employees strike. Indeed, many public employers can actually make a profit during
a strike. Tax revenues are still generated while labor costs drop sharply. Unlike a
private employer, a government does not have to worry about the long-run loss of
customers to strike-free competitors.126 Thus, public employers may enjoy more
leverage in resisting a striking union than do most private employers.12 7
Furthermore, there are other forces that make it easier for governments to resist
expensive wage demands. Part of that force is political.12 8 The business community,
with the assistance of the media, has done a thorough job of informing the public
about the cost of government labor contracts. 129 The public is now more budget
conscious and thus more willing to tolerate loss of services during a bargaining
deadlock. 130
There are also powerful economic forces assisting the government in resisting
union wage demands. The wage bill is by far the largest share of the cost in
government services.' 3' The era of rapid growth in government revenues to absorb
126. Competition is sometimes virtually nonexistent in the public sector. For example, only government can provide
a driver's license. Although private substitutes do exist for some services provided by government, the public service may
be heavily subsidized as compared with the private substitute (e.g., public versus private schools) or the private and public
services are only partial substitutes (e.g., private cars versus public transit).
127. The fact that public employee unions do not possess as much economic clout as their private sector counterparts
is corroborated by studies of union/nonunion wage differentials. During the 1970s, private sector union/nonunion wage
differentials widened substantially. In the public sector, however, unionization has not been associated with widening
wage differentials. Studies have shown that, during the 1970s, in the public sector average wages in unionized jurisdictions
did not rise relative to those of nonunion jurisdictions. D. MrrcHELL, CoNCEssIoN BARGAINING  mHE Punuc SEcrOR: A LESSER
FORCE 5 (Working Paper Series-74) (Aug. 1984); Mitchell, Unions and Wages in the Public Sector: A Review of Recent
Evidence, 12 J. CoLEcnWv NEGoTATIos 337, 338-40 (1983).
128. See Sackman, Redefining the Scope ofBargaining in Public Employment, 19 B.C.L. Rv. 155, 159-62 (1977)
(discussing the adverse economic and hostile political climate that has limited the ability of public employee unions to
prevail at the bargaining table and that has made it politically popular for politicians to resist union demands).
129. See, e.g., Katz, Municipal Pay Determination: The Case of San Francisco, 18 INDUS. RE.. 44, 49-58 (1979)
(discussing the role of business groups in limiting the wages of municipal employees in San Francisco).
130. Summers, supra note 111, at 1165-68 (arguing that insofar as wages are concerned, public employees are a
peculiarly disadvantaged interest group-one that stands alone against the multitude of voters who want to maximize
services while minimizing costs).
The public's reaction to the strike of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) in 1981 and
President Reagan's discharge of the strikers demonstrated that the public would support a hard management line in
government bargaining with unions. See Harris Poll Finds Most Oppose the Air Strike, New York Times, Aug. 21, 1981,
at A18; Most in Poll Oppose Public Worker Strikes, New York Times, Aug. 16, 1981, at 39. For discussions of the
PATCO dispute, see Dickinson, The Unmaking of a Union, 12 J. CotEcnvE NEoorTAnoNs 259 (1983); Northrup, The Rise
and Demise of PATCO, 37 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 167 (1984). Another example of strong public sentiment against
concessions to public sector unions occurred in San Francisco in the mid-1970s. See Katz, supra note 129, at 55-57; see
also Raskin, Conclusion: The Current Political Contest, in Putuc E,.u'to,,Ea UNIONS: A STUDY orF mE CRSI IN PuUC SEcrO
LABOR E ,AToNs 203, 205-10 (A. Chickering ed. 1976) (describing public sentiment against concessions to public sector
unions in San Francisco and elsewhere).
131. Employee wages and benefits constitute more than 60% of most public sector budgets. See D. STA.i,
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higher payroll costs has ended.132 It is wrong to think that public officials can easily
raise taxes to pay for collective bargaining contract wage increases. 3 3 There is great
public sensitivity to the higher tax bills resulting from a bargaining settlement. An
immediate public outcry goes up at sharp increases in municipal mill rates, water and
sewage charges, tuition fees, and the like.
In the normal course of events, these changing public sentiments are transmitted
through elections in which politicians must compete for votes on the basis of their
relative postures on industrial peace and financial restraint. In many states, including
Ohio, 134 there is an additional instrument which can make a profound difference in
that calculus: the taxpayer initiative. 135 The general public, in a vote in which the
interested government employees could be outnumbered by more than 10 to 1,136 can
establish a fixed limit on the funds available to pay higher government wages or upon
the wage levels themselves. That limit is constitutionally binding and cannot be
changed until another initiative passes. Public officials legally cannot ignore the limit
even if the union persuades them that a wage increase is justified. It is not feasible
for the union to bargain with the floating electorate to change its mind. The union
members could strike to express their frustrations with their employer's inability to
raise wages, but that would deprive employees of their paychecks without producing
MANAGING LocAL GoveumETr UNDER UNIoN PREssuRE 120 (1972) (payroll costs constitute 60-70% of municipal budgets);
Simon, The School Finance Decisions: Collective Bargaining and Future Finance Systems, 82 YALE L.J. 409, 413 (1973)
(employee compensation makes up approximately 65% of public school budgets).
132. State and local government expenditures increased from 8.4% of the gross national product in 1957 to 13.2%
in 1977. Comrrre oN Ecoo.wc DvmoPMETr, IMROVING MANAGF-iENT OF THE Pusuc WoRK FoRcE: THE CHAU.EME To STATE
AND Loc.m GovmuRNmEr 28-31, 33 (1978), reprinted in H. EDwARDs, R. Ci.,As & C. CRAvER, LABoR Rm AIONS LAW I THE
Pusuc SEcroR 6 (2d ed. 1979). Beginning in the mid-1970s, however, the economic fortunes of state and local governments
suffered a dramatic reversal. See Public Worker Outlook Austere; Fiscal Pressures Are Mounting, 915 Gov'r EML. REL.
REP. (BNA) 26-27 (June 1, 1981) (budget deficits plagued a majority of the nation's largest 275 cities during the
1979-1981 period); BNA Special Survey: RIFS, Layoffs, and EEO in State Governments, GoV'T EMPL. RE.. REP. (BNA)
at 3 (Feb. 1, 1982) (during fiscal year 1982, governments in 44 states resorted to layoffs); Anderson & London, Collective
Bargaining and the Fiscal Crisis in New York City: Cooperation for Survival, 10 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 373, 392 (1982)
(during the second half of the 1970s, New York City reduced its workforce by 20% and its total budgetary expenditures
by 21%).
133. Because wages constitute a large part of a public employer's operating budget, employees' wage proposals are
immediately "visible and . . . susceptible to focused resistance." Summers, supra note 111, at 1166.
134. OHIo CoNsT. art. II, § 1(a).
135. The best-publicized examples of taxpayer-initiated referenda limiting tax revenues were Proposition 13 in
California, CAL. Cossr. art. XIIIA, and Proposition 2-1/2 in Massachusetts, MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 59, § 21C (Michie/Law.
Coop. Supp. 1985). See Tax-Trimming Measure Passes in Mass.; 6 Other States Nix Similar Referenda, 889 Gov'r E .m.
REL. RP. (BNA) 12, 12-13 (Nov. 24, 1980). See also infra note 137.
The preemption provision of the PECBL, Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.10(A) (Page Supp. 1984), see infra notes
226-33 and accompanying text, would not apply to constitutional amendments approved pursuant to the initiative process
because a state constitutional provision would take precedence over any conflicting law. Other jurisdictions are divided
as to whether the bargaining law or the referendum provision prevails when the voter referendum adopts a legal restriction
short of a state constitutional amendment. Compare San Francisco Fire Fighters, Local 798 v. Bd. of Supervisors, 96 Cal.
App. 3d 538, 548-50, 158 Cal. Rptr. 145, 149-51 (1979) (amendment to city charter approved by referendum takes
precedence over bargaining law) with AFSCME Council 75, Local 350 v. Clackamas County, 687 P.2d 1102, 1108-11
(1984) (bargaining law prevails over civil service law providing that changes in employment conditions be approved in
a local referendum).
136. In Ohio, for example, there were 582,000 state and local government employees in 1984, compared to
7,846,000 residents of voting age, a ratio of more than I to 13. See Summary of Civilian Government Employment and
Payrolls, by State: October 1984, 23 Gov'T E.MIPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 1271 (Sept. 2, 1985) (151,000 state employees and
431,000 local employees); Bureau of Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 252
(1985) (7,846,000 Ohio residents, 18-years-old and over).
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any tangible results. This strategic "doomsday weapon" has no analog in the private
sector, where, as the union knows, employers have the authority to offer more money
if raising wage rates is less costly than a strike.
Furthermore, as labor costs go up, politicians in this Proposition 13 era137 realize
that they can win votes and public support by eliminating costly frills and by
introducing labor-saving technology. 138 It is no longer the case, if it ever was, that a
government job carries life-time tenure and immunity from layoffs.139 The more
stringent economic parameters shaping government wage determination have pro-
duced a considerably more elastic demand curve for public labor.140 Public sector
unions are beginning to experience the tradeoff between higher wages and fewer jobs
for their members. 141
The model which emerges from this view of the effectiveness of public employee
union strikes is vastly different from the model sketched by Professors Wellington and
Winter fifteen years ago. 142 These new parameters on public sector bargaining
strongly suggest that public employers should have fewer weapons at their disposal
in the event of a strike than private employers have, if the public employer and the
representative of its employees are to stand in a position of relative equality.
This, however, does not conclude the analysis of the distinction between private
and public strikes in determining what replacement rights public employers should
have during economic strikes. The final consideration is the nature of the services that
public employers provide. Public employers are generally monopoly suppliers of
services to the community. Moreover, governments provide services that the public,
through its elected representatives, has determined that it needs and wants govern-
ment to provide. In contrast, there are often alternative sources for the products and
services that private employers supply. Consequently, when operations are inter-
137. CAL. CONsT. art. XIIIA. Proposition 13 eliminated approximately seven billion dollars in property tax revenues
that would have been available to municipal governments in California. For a description of Proposition 13, see Swimmer,
The Impact of Proposition 13 on Public Employee Relations: The Case of Los Angeles, I1 J. Cou.EcnvE NEGOnAnoss 13
(1982).
138. See Sackman, supra note 128, at 159 ("Taxpayer opposition to the cost of public services has been mounting
steadily. The public has reacted strongly to the perception that inept managers have 'given away the shop.' In order to
make known their dissatisfaction, taxpayers have resorted to the political process to override the collective bargaining
process."); Vaughn & Dozier, Public Sector Bargaining Issues in the 1980's: A Neutral View, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEw YORK
UrnvEnsrrv 33RD ANNuAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 317, 318 (R. Adelman ed. 1981) ("[Tlhe political balance has
shifted. It used to be that elected officials were pushed toward easy settlements with public employee unions. Now,
pressures are pushing those officials away from costly settlements, and elected officials are beginning to find it 'good
politics' to be at least perceived as tough bargainers.").
139. For example, the number of public employees declined by nearly half a million between 1980 and 1983. See
BuREAu OF LABOR STAMsTICs, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EmLOyMNr AnD EARNINGS STATISTICS FOR THE UNTED STATES 45 table B-I
(Feb. 1984).
140. The notion of an inelastic demand for government services has been at least partially debunked in recent years
as government has responded to public demand for lower taxes and lower government expenditures by reducing the level
of services. See Anderson & London, supra note 132, at 381-84; Edwards, The Developing Labor Relations Law in the
Public Sector, 10 DuQ. L. REv. 357, 362-63 (1972).
141. See BNA Special Survey: RIFS, Layoffs, and EEO in State Governments, GOV'T E.uL. REL. REP. (BNA) at
3 (Feb. 1, 1982). One study has found that economic distress and threatened layoffs result in concession bargaining in
the public sectorjust as they do in the private sector. Furthermore, concession bargaining was concentrated in four states-
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Oregon-where the 1979 to 1983 recession cut most deeply into the tax base. D.
Mrrcueu., supra note 127, at 15-18, 23.
142. Compare text accompanying notes 126-41 supra with text accompanying notes 116-25 supra.
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rupted in the private sector, the impact on the general public is usually less severe than
when public sector operations are interrupted. 143 Therefore, one can argue that the
public employer should have the right, if not the obligation, to attempt to continue
operating and providing services to the public during a strike. Satisfying the public
need for governmental services may require the hiring of replacements for striking
workers.
The two broad distinctions between public and private sector strikes suggest
conflicting responses to the question of whether public employers should have a
greater or lesser right to replace economic strikers than their private sector counter-
parts. On the one hand, the fact that strikers generally exert less economic pressure
on public employers than on private employers suggests that public employers have
less need for the replacement weapon. On the other hand, since public employee
union strikes may result in termination of services to the community by a monopoly
supplier, a powerful argument may be made that the public employer should have a
greater right to replace economic strikers.44 Thus, a comparison of private and public
sector strikes does not provide a definite answer to the question of what replacement
rights public employers should have. The answer, if one exists, must lie elsewhere.
F. The Distinctions Between the Right to Strike Under the NLRA and the PECBL
An examination of the distinctions between the right to strike under the
NLRA and the PECBL casts doubt upon the appropriateness of applying the Mackay
doctrine in the Ohio public sector. In marked contrast to the NLRA, 145 the PECBL
imposes substantial limitations on the right to strike, 146 demonstrating the Ohio
General Assembly's view that a strike in the public sector is a highly dangerous
weapon. The thrust of the PECBL is to confine the use of the strike weapon to
economic interest disputes. 47 Strikes arising out of recognition disputes, 148 contract
143. Of course, private sector strikes can sometimes discomfort substantial portions of the public, can occur in a
monopoly situation, and can sometimes generate substantial political pressure for a settlement. On the other hand, some
public sector strikes may have less of an effect on the public, may affect only a small part of the public, or may affect
only those with little political clout. See also supra note 117.
144. A public employer is not merely an employing entity like a private company; it is charged with the constitutional
responsibility of protecting the public interest through the providing of essential services to the community. Whereas in
the private sector there exist only two essential parties-the employer and the union-whose interests must be reconciled,
in the public sector there is an additional party: the public. Harmonizing public employees' collective bargaining rights
with the public's right to receive public services requires a full appreciation of the public employer's dual identity as
employer and political entity.
In order to best accommodate this triad of competing interests, public sector strikes must be examined in their own
right instead of simply conceiving of them in terms of the differences from the private sector.
145. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982) ("Nothing in [the NLRA], except as specifically provided for herein, shall
be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations
or qualifications on that right.").
Congress, through a series of legislative enactments, not only granted private sector employees a right to strike, but
also deprived employers of their traditional remedies of injunction and damage suits. See 38 Stat. pt. 1730 (1914) [Clayton
Antitrust Act], codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 17, 26 (1982), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982); 47 Stat. pt. 170 (1932)
[Norris-LaGuardia Act], codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982); 44 Stat. pt. II 577 (1926) [Railway Labor Act],
codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982); 49 Stat. pt. 1449 (1935) [Wagner Act], codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 13-33.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 26-31.
148. Otmo REv. CODE AN. § 4117.1 l(B)(5) (Page Supp. 1984) (prohibiting recognition strikes).
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grievances, 149 employer unfair labor practices,' t 0 and jurisdictional disputes' 5 1 are
therefore barred. Even when strike action is legitimate, a series of formal procedural
steps must first be completed: a notice to bargain, good faith bargaining, government
mediation, fact-finding, and, finally, a ten-day strike notice. 152 The Ohio General
Assembly has been remarkably ambitious in its use of the law to limit collective
employee action.
Congress has demonstrated a far different attitude toward employee work
stoppages. Its hands-off attitude is illustrated by the facts in NLRB v. Washington
Aluminum Co. 153 There, a small group of workers arrived at their machine shop one
morning and found it very cold due to a malfunctioning furnace. When the employees
decided to walk off their jobs the employer discharged them. The employees filed
unfair labor practice charges under the NLRA. 154 Ultimately, the United States
Supreme Court upheld their claim, finding that the employer had violated the NLRA
and ordering reinstatement of the employees. 155 The Court held that the employer had
interfered with the employees' legally protected right to engage in "concerted
activities" under section 7 of the NLRA, 156 notwithstanding the fact that there was
no union representing the employees, no system of formal negotiations, and no
communication by the employees that morning with the employer (who would have
told them that tlie furnace was being fixed).1 57 Thus, private sector law views a strike
as a natural, affirmative right of workers to engage in even spontaneous work
stoppages to protest their employment terms and conditions. 158 Only grudgingly and
sparingly have restrictions been placed on that right in the fifty-year history of the
NLRA. 159
The legal attitude of the PECBL towards public sector strikes in Ohio is far
removed from that of the NLRA. If the workers at Washington Aluminum had wanted
to walk off their jobs as public employees in Ohio, they would have had to go to a
union, become members, be formally certified by the SERB after an election (or be
voluntarily recognized by the employer), 160 have the union deliver a written notice to
bargain, 161 negotiate in good faith with the employer to try to settle a full collective
agreement, 162 complete a process of government mediation and fact-finding, 163 and
149. Id. § 4117.09(B)(1) (requiring all collective bargaining agreements to contain a grievance procedure); id. §
4117.15(A) (prohibiting strikes during the term of a collective bargaining agreement).
150. Id. § 4117.15(B) (employer unfair labor practice not a defense to an injunction action to halt the strike).
151. Id. § 4117.11(B)(4).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 18-25.
153. 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
154. Id. at 11-12.
155. Id. at 18.
156. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section 7 grants employees the right to engage in concerted activities for the purpose
of mutual aid or protection. Section 8(a)(1) prohibits employers from interfering with the exercise of this right. Id. §
158(a)(1).
157. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 15-16 (1962).
158. As President Reagan has written, "we have the right as free men to refuse to work forjust grievances: the strike
is an inalienable weapon of any citizen." R. RAoAN & R. HusLER, WNERE's ma Pasr OF ME? 138 (1965).
159. 2 C. MoRis, supra note 39, at 1002-06.
160. Oreo REV. COD ANN. § 4117.05 (Page Supp. 1984).
161. Id. § 4117.14(B).
162. Id. § 4117.11(B)(3).
163. Id. § 4117.14.
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then give a ten-day notice to the employer and the SERB of their intention to strike. 164
At that point the employees could legally walk off their jobs to protest the furnace
malfunction. (Presumably, by that time the funace would have been repaired;
certainly winter would be over.) Even then, the right to strike is not guaranteed. If the
union had won a contract settlement and a collective bargaining agreement were in
effect, strike action would be absolutely banned. 165 The employees would have to file
a grievance about the furnace and take it to arbitration. 166 The right to strike under the
PECBL, therefore, is highly circumscribed.
In the private sector, employees are generally free to engage in an economic
strike at any time without providing any notice if there is no collective bargaining
agreement in existence.' 67 Under the PECBL, an economic strike may occur only
after the union has bargained in good faith, undergone governmental mediation and
fact-finding, and given a ten-day notice to the employer and the SERB.168 Moreover,
a strike may not occur under the PECBL during the term of a collective bargaining
agreement, 69 and public employees may not strike unless they are represented by a
labor organization.I7 0
The right of employers to wage economic war is also more limited under the
PECBL. Private employers may lawfully implement both offensive and defensive
lockouts. '71 In Ohio, public employers are expressly prohibited from engaging in any
kind of a lockout.172
Unlike the Congress, the Ohio General Assembly did not intend to leave the
collective bargaining process to "the free play of economic forces." ' 173 Conse-
quently, it seems unlikely that the Ohio General Assembly contemplated the private
sector precedents condoning, if not encouraging, economic warfare to be superim-
posed upon the collective bargaining process fashioned by the PECBL.
164. Id. § 4117.14(D)(2).
165. Id. § 4117.15(A).
166. This scenario assumes, of course, that the malfunctioning furnace did not result in an abnormally dangerous
or unhealthful working condition. If the workers had a good faith belief that working under such conditions was
abnormally dangerous or unhealthful, then the work stoppage would not be considered a strike and there would be no
restrictions on their right to cease working. Id. § 4117.01(H).
167. Under section 8(d) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982), a union that desires to terminate or modify an
existing collective bargaining agreement may not strike for 60 days after giving written notice to the employer or before
the termination date of the agreement, whichever date occurs later. Id. § 158(d)(1), (4). In addition, the union must notify
the appropriate federal and state mediation agencies within 30 days of notification to the employer. Id. § 158(d)(3). In
the health care industry, section 8(d) requires longer cooling off periods of 90 days and 60 days. Id. § 158(d)(A).
Furthermore, section 8(g) requires a union to give a health care institution a 10-day notice of its intent to strike. Id. §
158(g).
168. Onlo REv. CODE AN. § 4117.14 (Page Supp. 1984).
169. Id. §§ 4117.15(A), .18(C).
170. See supra note 31.
171. See, e.g., Botsford Concrete Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 804 (1970) (single-employer defensive lockout); NLRB v.
Truck Drivers Local 449 (Buffalo Linen Supply Co.), 353 U.S. 87 (1957) (multi-employer defensive lockout); American
Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965) (single-employer offensive lockout); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278
(1965) (multi-employer defensive lockout).
172. Oalo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.11 (A)(7) (Page Supp. 1984).
173. NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971).
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IV. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE PECBL
RELEVANT TO THE STRIKER REPLACEMENT ISSUE
The PECBL is silent on the right of public employers to replace either tempo-
rarily or permanently lawful economic strikers. The NLRA is also silent on this issue,
but the Supreme Court has construed it to permit the permanent replacement of lawful
economic strikers. 174 This section reviews the legislative history, analyzes the
statutory scheme devised by the Ohio General Assembly, and concludes that neither
provides a definitive answer to whether public sector economic strikers may be
replaced.
The Ohio General Assembly apparently did not address the question of striker
replacements while the PECBL was under consideration. The Ohio Legislative
Service Commission was not asked to research the question nor was it asked to draft
any proposed amendments expressly permitting or prohibiting strike replacements.'
75
Furthermore, two legislative aides actively involved in the enactment of the PECBL
have no recollection of any discussion of the issue by either proponents or opponents
of the PECBL.176
Although no legislator apparently focused on the issue, two witnesses testifying
before legislative committees considering the bill expressly addressed striker replace-
ments. 177 An opponent of the bill urged that it be amended to include a provision
recognizing the right of public employers to replace economic strikers, 178 while a
proponent of the bill asked that it be amended to include a prohibition on the hiring
of strike replacements.179 The legislature's failure to respond to either of these
conflicting requests for explicit language on the striker replacement issue provides no
guidance on the proper construction of the PECBL.
Furthermore, the few commentators who have noted the PECBL's silence on the
replacement issue have refrained from taking a definite position. Two articles have
suggested, however, that permanently replacing lawful economic strikers may be an
174. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
175. Interview with Richard E. Masek, Principal Research Associate for the Ohio Legislative Service Commission
(Aug. 1, 1985).
176. Telephone interview with Malcolm Porter, legislative aide to the bill's Senate sponsor State Senator Eugene
Branstool (Aug. 2, 1985); telephone interview with John Looman, legislative aide to the bill's House sponsor State
Representative Clifton Skeen (Aug. 2, 1985).
177. No transcripts of legislative committee hearings are prepared. All submitted written testimony is retained,
however. A thorough reading of all written testimony revealed only two references to striker replacements. See infra notes
178 & 179 and accompanying text.
178. Testimony of Frank H. Stewart, a management lawyer with Taft, Stettinius & Hollister in Cincinnati, Ohio,
before the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee (Apr. 6, 1983):
The bill also prescribes an inequality of bargaining power. Most public employees may strike, but the public
employer may not lock out. Further, in the private sector, employers may replace economic strikers. This has
long been held as the counterpoint of the union's right to strike. There is no provision recognizing such a right
in SB 133. Public employers should be entitled to no less than their private counterparts.
Id. at 13.
179. Testimony of Robert J. Repas, a member of the Elyria, Ohio Board of Education, before the House Commerce
and Labor Committee (June 2, 1983): "Just as the Bill protects the public position by requiring penalties against employees
engaging in an illegal job action, so must the Bill include prohibitions, with penalties, against employers hiring
replacements for employees on legal strikes." Id. at 4.
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employer unfair labor practice. 180 A third has merely noted that the PECBL does not
expressly address the issue. 181
The overall structure and specific provisions of the PECBL can be used to argue
either for or against permanent striker replacements. The absolute prohibition on
employer lockouts 182 provides three possible grounds for arguing that the PECBL
should be construed to permit employers to replace lawful strikers either temporarily
or permanently, or both. First, one possible rationale for prohibiting employers from
locking out is to prevent them from bringing services to a halt, presumably on the
basis that public services are too important and must be maintained to protect the
public's health, safety, and welfare. Because the lockout prohibition may evince a
legislative desire to maintain public services even though it may result in a diminution
of the employer's bargaining power, one could argue that permitting public employers
to replace strikers would likewise serve the Ohio General Assembly's overriding
concern for maintaining public services even though replacement may result in a
diminution of the employees' bargaining power.
Second, the lockout prohibition takes away management's ability to force a
strike or to control the timing of a strike. Consequently, as the legislature should have
foreseen, 83 most strikes will be timed to occur at the most critical time. For example,
most strikes in treasurers' offices will occur at tax time, most strikes in county
engineers' offices will occur when heavy snows are forecast, and most strikes in
auditors' offices will occur when the budget is being prepared or when books are
being closed. 184 Because the lockout prohibition guarantees that most strikes will be
timed to occur when services are most desperately needed, one can argue that the
legislature intended for management to have the right to replace strikers in order to
maintain public services at these critical times.
Finally, because the PECBL is modeled somewhat after the NLRA,185 one could
infer that the legislature assumed that public employers would be entitled to the same
economic weapons that their private counterparts have, unless such weapons were
expressly prohibited by the PECBL. Lockouts, for example, are permitted under the
180. O'Reilly & Gath, supra note 10, at 926 ("Replacement workers could be hired, but the tone of the statute
suggests that they will not be permanent."); id. at 926 n.370 ("Query if a union can win an unfair practice 'coercion'
charge premised on such replacement action by the public employer."); Public Sector Collective Bargaining: One Year
After, 41 CoLUmBus BAR Ass'N BAR Bpms 4, 6 (March 1985) ("Several management representatives also have expressed
concern about an employer's ability to hire permanent replacements during a legal, economic strike. By one reading of
the law, such action could be an unfair labor practice.").
181. Note, supra note 10, at 244 ("Another important difference between the new Ohio law and the federal labor
relations law is the Ohio Act's silence on the question of whether a public employer is permitted to hire permanent
replacements.") (footnote omitted).
182. Ouio R-v. CODE ANN. § 4117.11(A)(7) (Page Supp. 1984). This section provides:
It is an unfair labor practice for a public employer, its agents, or representatives to: . . . (7) Lock out or
otherwise prevent employees from performing their regularly assigned duties where an object thereof is to bring
pressure on the employees or an employee organization to compromise or capitulate to the employer's terms
regarding a labor relations dispute ....
Id.
183. See testimony of Greg Van Ho, Director of Personnel & Purchasing for Medina County Commission, before
the House Commerce and Labor Subcommittee (June 1, 1983), at 3 (testifying that lockout prohibition will result in strikes
being timed to inflict the most harm on the public).
184. Id.
185. But see supra note 110.
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NLRA186 but are expressly prohibited by the PECBL. 187 Consequently, according to
this argument, if the legislature had not intended for public employers to have access
to the replacement weapon, it would have expressly prohibited that weapon. This
argument has particular force in view of the fact that the right to replace is so well
established in the private sector.188
Another section of the PECBL, however, supports arguments against permanent
strike replacements. The PECBL instructs the SERB and the courts how to interpret
it whenever there are any ambiguities. The PECBL "shall be construed liberally for
the accomplishment of the purpose of promoting orderly and constructive relation-
ships between all public employers and their employees."1 89 Under this mandate, the
SERB and the courts must determine what construction of the PECBL concerning
strike replacements will best promote good relationships between public employers
and their employees. The effect this provision has in the context of striker replace-
ments may depend upon the kind of "relationships" the provision is construed to
promote.
One possible reading is that it means "bargaining" relationships. If so, then this
section may become a vehicle for the SERB and the courts to deny and grant
economic weapons to each side depending upon relative bargaining power, since it is
generally agreed that in a system of collective bargaining the employer and the
employees' representative must stand in a position of relative equality.1 90 Under this
reading, the SERB and the courts may believe they have authority to redress any
bargaining relationship inequalities. As a result, employers will be granted the right
to replace if they are perceived to be the weaker party and be denied that right if they
are perceived to be the stronger party. In the public sector, strikes are generally less
harmful economically to employers because tax revenues continue to accrue while the
strikers are not receiving paychecks.' 9' Thus, in order to equalize "bargaining"
relationships, the SERB would probably deny permanent strike replacements.
Alternatively, the term "relationships" in the PECBL's liberal construction may
be read to mean "employment" relationships. Under this reading, the SERB and the
courts would be compelled to deny employers the right to replace. Nothing could be
more disorderly and destructive of employment relationships than the existence of
permanent replacements on the job. During the strike, it is inevitable that there will
be disorder, and perhaps even violence, as strikers watch others cross the picket line
to render the strike ineffective and to take their jobs, perhaps permanently. After the
strike, permanent replacements and returned or reinstated strikers will be forced to
work together. It is difficult to conceive of a situation more fraught with the potential
186. See supra note 171.
187. See supra note 182.
188. See supra note 48.
189. OHio Rev. CODE ANN. § 4117.22 (Page Supp. 1984). One commentary has opined that this provision "may have
unexpected and wide-reaching effects." J. Lewis & S. SPnM, supra note 10, at 117.
190. See, e.g., Comment, Anti-Strikebreaking Legislation-The Effect and Validity of State-Imposed Criminal
Sanctions, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 190, 215 (1966) ("collective bargaining . . . is promoted when the two parties are of
relatively equal strength").
191. See supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
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for destructive relationships. For the permanently replaced strikers, their employment
relationship has been indefinitely, and perhaps permanently, severed. It is difficult to
imagine how the permanent replacement of strikers could result in the promotion of
"orderly and constructive relationships between all public employers and their
employees." Thus, in order to promote orderly and constructive "employment"
relationships, this reading of section 4117.22 would deny permanent striker replace-
ments.
In sum, an examination of the legislative history, the lockout prohibition, and the
liberal construction mandate provides inconclusive and conflicting answers to the
striker replacement question. No member of the Ohio General Assembly apparently
focused on the issue, and the two witnesses testifying before legislative committees
on the matter apparently drew conflicting inferences from the bill's silence-one
witness inferring that the bill permitted striker replacements and the other inferring
that it did not. The lockout prohibition can be the basis for an argument permitting
striker replacements, but an opposing argument can be made that a liberal construc-
tion of the PECBL would prohibit striker replacements. Thus, we must look else-
where for an answer to the striker replacement issue.
V. THE EFFECT OF THE OHIO CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM ON THE PUBLIC
EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO REPLACE ECONOMIC STRIKERS
The uncertain relationship between the PECBL and the Ohio civil service system
complicates the task of determining the proper construction of the PECBL. The Ohio
General Assembly has established a hierarchy that gives precedence to the PECBL
over the civil service system whenever there is a conflict.192 As has been discussed,
however, no express provision or clear legislative intent exists concerning the striker
replacement issue' 93 that would prevail over any conflicting civil service provision.
The civil service laws generally impose significant constraints on the freedom of Ohio
public employers to make personnel moves such as discharges, replacements, and
transfers. If applicable, the civil service laws would severely limit the employer's
ability to respond to a strike and to make the personnel changes necessary to maintain
services during a strike. This section first reviews the civil service provisions that
would appear to restrict the employer's ability to respond to a strike. Although a
strong argument can be made that the Ohio civil service laws preclude public
employers from permanently replacing most economic strikers, this section concludes
that applying the civil service laws to employer replacement of strikers so undermines
the regulatory scheme of the PECBL that a conflict between the civil service system
and the PECBL concerning the striker replacement issue should be inferred. 194 Thus,
192. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.10(A) (Page Supp. 1984).
193. See supra Section IV.
194. For discussions of the statutory preemption issue generally. see Alleyne, Statutory Restraints on the Bargaining
Obligation in Public Employment, in LABOR ELAToNs LAw IN THE PUB11C SECoR 100, 109-11 (A. Knapp ed. 1977);
Sackman, supra note 128, at 169-72, 179-81; Schmedemann, The Scope of Bargaining in Minnesota's Public Sector
Labor Relations: A Proposal for Change, 10 Wm. Mrrca L. Rsv. 213, 229-39, 253-58 (1984).
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public employers should not be bound by civil service restrictions on personnel
actions during the course of a lawful economic strike.
Public employment in Ohio is governed generally by a comprehensive statutory
civil service system 195 based on merit and fitness mandated by the Ohio Constitu-
tion. 196 Civil service employees are divided into two groups, classified 197 and
unclassified.1 98 This comprehensive civil service system and the rights it affords
classified civil service employees will have an impact on any attempt by a public
employer to replace striking public employees, unless the PECBL has preempted the
civil service system during lawful economic strikes.
A. Permanent Replacement of Striking Employees
If the civil service laws apply, permanent replacement generally would not
appear to be a legally available response by the public employer to an economic
strike. To determine the legality of permanent replacement under the civil service
laws, the starting point is that lawfully appointed public employeest 99 in Ohio have
a statutory right to continued employment and can be reduced in position, suspended,
or removed from their jobs only for just cause. 200 Employee participation in a lawful
economic strike should not constitute the requisite just cause for reduction in position,
195. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 124.01(A) (Page 1984) defines civil service as "all offices and positions of trust or
employment in the service of the state and the counties, cities, city health districts, general health districts, and city school
districts thereof." The civil service system is governed by id. §§ 124.01-.99 (Page 1984 & Supp. 1984).
196. OHIo CoNsr. art. XV, § 10 (adopted Sept. 3, 1912) provides that "[a]ppointments and promotions in the civil
service of the state, the several counties, and cities, shall be made according to merit and fitness, to be ascertained as far
as practicable, by competitive examinations. Laws shall be passed providing for the enforcement of this provision."
197. Classified service is defined as "the competitive classified civil service of the state, the several counties, cities,
city health districts, general health districts, city school districts thereof, and civil service townships." OHIO Rv. CODE
ANN. § 124.01(C) (Page 1984). "The classified service shall comprise all persons in the employ of the state and the several
counties, cities, city health districts, general health districts, and city school districts thereof, not specifically included in
the unclassified service." Id. § 124.1 1(B) (Page Supp. 1984).
198. The unclassified service is comprised of positions exempt from the examination requirement of chapter 124 of
the Ohio Revised Code. Id. § 124.11 (A) (Page Supp. 1984). The positions include elected officers, employees of the board
of elections, members of boards and commissions, heads of departments, commissioned and noncommissioned officers
and enlisted men, superintendents, teachers, principals, bailiffs, official stenographers, assistants to the attorney general,
students, and employees of the governor's office. Id.
199. There are two types of lawful appointments, certified and provisional. A certified appointment is made in the
following manner: (1) a competitive exam for a classification is given; (2) an eligible list is prepared of all the persons
taking the test who receive the minimum grade; (3) an appointing authority notifies the director of Administrative Services
that there is a position to be filled; (4) the director certifies to the appointing authority the names and addresses of the three
candidates standing highest on the list; and (5) the appointing authority fills the position by appointing one of the three
persons certified to him. Id. §§ 124.26, .27 (Page 1984).
A provisional appointment occurs when there is no eligible list for a classification. Since the director cannot certify
names of persons eligible to fill the position, the appointing authority may nominate a person to the director for a non-
competitive examination. The director certifies that person as qualified, and she is appointed provisionally to fill the
vacancy. Id. § 124.30(A).
200. The statute states that:
[t]he tenure of every officer or employee in the classified service of the state . . . holding a position under this
chapter of the Revised Code, shall be during good behavior and efficient service and no such officer or employee
shall be reduced in pay or position, suspended, or removed, except as provided in section 124.32 of the Revised
Code, and for incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, drunkenness, immoral conduct, insubordination, dis-
courteous treatment of the public, neglect of duty, violation of such sections or the rules of the director of
administrative services or the commission, or any other failure of good behavior, or any other acts of
misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office.
Id. § 124.34.
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suspension, or removal. 20' If lawfully striking employees cannot be suspended or
removed from their jobs, however, the civil service laws prohibit employers from
acquiring permanent replacements to fill the strikers' positions. Under the civil
service statute, a permanent replacement can be appointed only when there is a
"position to be filled" 202 or a "vacancy." 20 3 Because these terms have been narrowly
defined, 2°4 an employee's participation in a lawful strike should not create a vacancy
or a position to be filled. Thus, because the civil service laws do not permit permanent
appointments to government jobs unless there is a vacancy and because the just cause
provision precludes employers from ousting lawfully striking employees to create a
vacancy, the civil service system-if not preempted by the PECBL-would bar the
permanent replacement of tenured employees engaged in a lawful economic strike.
The permanent replacement of striking probationary employees, 20 5 however,
could be accomplished under the Ohio civil service laws.20 6 Probationary employees
do not have the civil service statutory protections afforded to tenured employees. 20 7
Public employers have broad discretionary powers in removing probationary employ-
ees, 208 which are subject to very limited review. 2° 9 Once the probationary employee
201. Striking is not a statutory cause for removal. See id. Furthermore, engaging in a lawful strike should not
constitute "failure of good behavior" or "neglect of duty." Failure of good behavior is defined as "behavior contrary
to recognized standards of propriety and morality, misconduct, wrong conduct, all of which constitute and are the
equivalent of conduct unbecoming an officer or employee of the city." State ex rel. Ashbaugh v. Bahr, 68 Ohio App.
308, 313, 40 N.E.2d 677, 680 (Mahoning County Ct. App. 1941). Although strikes prohibited by the now-repealed
Ferguson Act, Oino REv. CoDE ANN. § 4117.02 (repealed Apr. 1, 1984), were held to constitute "neglect of duty," Diebler
v. Denton, 49 Ohio App. 2d 303, 304, 361 N.E.2d 1072, 1074 (1976), it seems unlikely that an employee engaging in
a lawful strike will be "considered to have abandoned and terminated his appointment or employment .... Oteo REv.
CoD ANN. § 4117.05 (repealed Apr. 1, 1984). But see Local 1494, International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur
d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 586 P.2d 1346 (1978) (holding that a refusal to report to work when ordered to do so gave the
employer cause to discharge firefighters engaged in a lawful strike).
202. "The head of a department, office, or institution in which a position in the classified service is to be filled [shall
appoint a permanent replacement]." Olto REv. CoDE ANN. § 124.27 (Page 1984).
203. Id. §§ 124.271, .30(A), .31(A).
204. See, e.g., State er rel. Chapman v. Lesser, 94 Ohio St. 387, 402, 115 N.E. 33, 36 (1916) (a permanently
suspended firechief's position was not "vacant" until a valid and final judgment concerning his permanent suspension had
been entered); State ex rel. Baker v. Lea, 10 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 364, 368 (Cuyahoga C.P. 1910) (a position is not "vacant"
unless the incumbent employee has no "lawful right to continue therein"), affd 83 Ohio St. 518, 94 N.E. 1109 (1911).
The Ohio Administrative Code contains the following definition:
"Available vacancy"-Means an existing funded position, not currently filled by an incumbent which the
appointing authority desires to fill. The existence of vacant positions on an appointing authority's table of
organization or roster of positions shall not mean that a position is an available vacancy.
Oieo Anumr. CoDs § 123:1-47-01(A)(9) (1984 Supp.).
205. "All original and provisional appointments, including provisional appointments made pursuant to section
124.30 of the Revised Code, shall be for a probationary period, not less than sixty days nor more than one year .... "
Oflo Rrv. CoD Ar. § 124.37 (Page 1984).
206. This analysis ignores the impact of the PECBL and whether the removal of a lawfully striking probationary
employee would violate id. § 4117.1 l(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1984), which prohibits employer interference, restraint, or
coercion of employees exercising their statutory rights.
207. "If the service of the probationary employee is unsatisfactory, he may be removed or reduced at any time during
his probationary period after completion of sixty days or one-half of his probationary period, whichever is greater." Id.
§ 124.27 (Page 1984).
208. Hill v. Gatz, 63 Ohio App. 2d 170, 410 N.E.2d 1268 (Cuyahoga County Ct. App. 1979). But see State ex rel.
Clements v. Babb, 150 Ohio St. 359, 82 N.E.2d 737 (1948) (holding that the reasons for removal of a probationary
employee cannot be merely frivolous conclusions).
209. Walton v. Montgomery County Welfare Dep't, 69 Ohio St. 2d 58, 430 N.E.2d 930 (1982). A discharged
probationary employee, however, may have recourse under Ouio REv. CODE ANN. § 124.56 (Page 1984), which allows the
state personnel board of review to investigate removal, reduction, suspension, layoff, or appointment if it has reason to
believe that the appointing authority abused his discretion.
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is legally removed, a vacancy exists which can be filled with a permanent replace-
ment.
B. Temporary Replacement of Striking Employees
Although the civil service system, if applicable, would prohibit the permanent
replacement of most civil service employees, temporary replacement for one month
would not violate the civil service laws. Temporary appointments are expressly
authorized in Ohio Revised Code Section 124.30(C): "Where the services to be
rendered by an appointee are for a temporary period, not to exceed one month, and
the need of such service is important and urgent, the appointing authority may select
for such temporary service any person on the proper list of those eligible for
permanent appointment.' ' 210
This statute does not mention the availability of a "position to be filled" or a
"vacancy;" instead, it uses the term "services" and avoids the problem of invading
the employment rights of the striker. 21' The temporary appointment is limited,
however, to one month and successive temporary appointments to the position cannot
be made. 212 Temporary replacements also may be permitted by the public employer's
statutory ability to make emergency appointments. Section 124.30(A) states that
"[iun case of emergency, an appointment may be made without regard to the rules of
Sections 124.01 to 124.64 of the Revised Code, but in no case to continue longer than
thirty days, and in no case shall successive appointments be made." '213 The statute
also allows for temporary appointments to cover periods of sickness or disability
suffered by employees. 214
In hiring temporary replacements, the public employer would have to use care
in labeling such replacements. This labeling would be important in determining
whether the temporary replacement would acquire any of the statutory civil service
protections that would prevent her dismissal once the strike is terminated. There
would be no dismissal problems with a temporary replacement hired under Section
124.30(A) and termed an emergency appointment. An emergency appointment is
unclassified and enjoys none of the civil service protections.215 A temporary replace-
ment under Section 124.30(C) is hired for a specific period that cannot exceed thirty
days. 216 The problem would arise if a public employer were to make provisional
appointments to replace its striking workers. 217 A provisional appointment is made
when an employer who is faced with an urgent need to fill a vacancy receives no
certified list of eligible candidates because such a list does not exist.21 8 A nominee
210. Onxo REv. CODE ANN. § 124.30(C) (Page 1984).
211. See also Onto ADMiN. CoDE § 123:1-21-02(1982): "Where a position is vacant for a temporary period by reason
of sickness or disability of a regular employee, and the Director is unable to certify from an eligible list for such temporary
period, interim provisional appointments may be authorized for the period of sickness or disability."
212. Otno REv. CODE ANN. § 124.30(C) (Page 1984).
213. Id. § 124.30(A).
214. Id.
215. Oino AD.NuN. CODE § 123:1-21-04 (1982).
216. Onto REv. CODE AN. § 124.30(C) (Page 1984).
217. Id. § 124.30(A).
218. Id.
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may take a noncompetitive exam and be appointed provisionally to fill the vacancy
until a competitive exam is conducted. A provisional employee enjoys the same rights
as a certified employee and can be removed only for cause or by a certified
appointment following a competitive exam for that position. 2 19 If a public employer
were to use provisional appointments to replace strikers, both the provisional
employee and the replaced striker may have valid claims to the same position once
the strike has ended.
Besides using temporary appointments, a public employer also could transfer
employees in order to continue providing services during a strike. 220 There are,
however, substantial statutory restrictions on this alternative. The temporary transfer
must be to a similar position; it can only last for thirty days; and only one temporary
transfer can be made during a six-month period.221 The employee's consent is not
needed, however, for any transfer of thirty days or less. 222 The employee must
comply with a transfer order while her appeal is pending with the State Personnel
Board of Review. 223 Again, the public employer would have to exercise care in
transferring employees during a strike because a transfer for more than thirty days
becomes a permanent transfer.22 4 Since only employees with vested rights can be
transferred, 22 when the strike ends a public employer could again be faced with two
employees making legally justified claims to the same position.
Under the civil service laws, a public employer could legally use temporary
replacements for striking public employees. However, this practice would be re-
stricted by the labeling of these temporary replacements and by the time constraints
that the statute provides.
In sum, if the civil service laws apply to employer personnel moves during a
lawful economic strike, the public employer's ability to maintain public services is
severely circumscribed. First, only probationary employees can be permanently
replaced. Second, temporary replacements can be retained for only thirty days. Third,
nonbargaining unit employees can be transferred to perform struck work for only
thirty days.
C. Critique of the Application of Civil Service Laws to Striking Employees
The civil service system may clash with the PECBL's collective bargaining
regime. The Ohio General Assembly anticipated this confict and expressly dealt with
it. Knowing it could not anticipate all such possible clashes, the legislature resolved
them by providing for the collective bargaining regime to take priority over incon-
sistent civil service law provisions.
219. A provisional employee holds her position under civil service protection until she is displaced by a regular
appointee certified from an eligible list, she is removed for cause pursuant to statute, or her position is abolished. State
ex rel. Dahmen v. City of Youngstown, 40 Ohio App. 2d 166, 318 N.E.2d 433 (Mahoning County Ct. App. 1973).
220. Omio R v. CoDE ArN. § 124.33 (Page 1984).
221. Id. §§ 124.32(A), .33.
222. Onto AmnN. CODE § 123:1-25-01(E) (1984 Supp.).
223. Id. § 123:1-24-01(M).
224. Id. § 123:1-25-01(G).
225. Id. § 123:1-25-01(A).
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The issue is, therefore, the extent to which the PECBL supersedes civil service
rules. Under the PECBL's supremacy clause, 226 civil service rules are superseded by
any collective bargaining agreement that provides for final and binding arbitration.2 7
Strikes are lawful, however, only when there is no agreement in existence, 228 and the
PECBL declares that "[w]here no agreement exists.., the public employer... [is]
subject to all applicable state or local laws or ordinances pertaining to the ... terms
and conditions of employment for public employees." 2 2 9 Were this the only consid-
eration, one could argue that because there is no contract in existence when public
employees are lawfully on strike, employees are entitled to the full panoply of civil
service protections, which includes the right of tenured employees to be free from
permanent replacement while on strike.2 30
The analysis does not end there, however. The PECBL also contains a suprem-
acy clause declaring that, with a few exceptions not relevant here,231 it "prevails over
any and all other conflicting laws, resolutions, provisions, present or future, except
as otherwise specified in [the PECBL] . . . . ",232 There is nothing in the PECBL that
specifies that civil service rules apply to the replacement rights of employers or the
reinstatement rights of lawful strikers. Consequently, the question is whether the
PECBL conflicts with the civil service laws. Because the PECBL is silent on
replacement and reinstatement rights during economic strikes, there is no explicit
conflict. Any conflict must be inferred by construing the PECBL to contain an
implicit provision concerning striker replacement.
One can reasonably argue that the SERB and the courts should not read a conflict
into the PECBL where no such conflict appears on the face of the statute. In view of
the fact that the civil service laws would dictate approximately the same result that this
Article reaches relying on public policy arguments, 233 it would be tempting to
conclude that in the face of legislative silence the civil service laws should determine
the parameters of replacement and reinstatement rights.
Although it is a close question, there are several reasons why civil service rules
should not be dispositive. First, in granting the right to strike, the legislature did not
distinguish between tenured and probationary employees; the rights of the two groups
as strikers should be the same. If one group of strikers is subject to permanent
replacement while another group within the same bargaining unit is not, the union
representing the two groups is confronted with a perplexing dilemma. The union's
constituents would not share a commonality of interest on a very important factor in
deciding whether to strike, i.e., the risks attendant to using that economic weapon.
Probationary employees would be more willing to cross a picket line, thereby perhaps
226. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.10(A) (Page Supp. 1984).
227. Id.
228. See supra text accompanying note 26.
229. Osto REv. CODE Arm. § 4117.10(A) (Page Supp. 1984).
230. See supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
231. The PECBL has a special transit worker exception, which provides that state laws and arrangements relating
to the acquisition of federal mass transit funds will take precedence to the extent necessary for the acquisition of such
funds. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117. 10(A) (Page Supp. 1984).
232. Id.
233. See infra Section VIII.
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rendering the strike ineffective. Collective bargaining requires solidarity on the part
of the employees; the civil service rules would undercut that solidarity.
Second, the PECBL instructs the SERB and the courts to construe it "liberally
for the accomplishment of the purpose of promoting orderly and constructive
relationships between all public employers and their employees.' '234 The legislature's
message is that "the benefit of the doubt should be given to the remedial collective
bargaining position." 2 35 Thus, the right to replace should be based upon the policy
considerations underlying public sector collective bargaining, not upon the dictates of
a prior statute which was intended to redress an entirely different problem. 236
Third, the enactment of the lockout prohibition 37 suggests that the legislature
did not contemplate that civil service laws would limit an employer's use of economic
weapons during collective bargaining. Civil service protections make employer
lockouts improper.23 8 Consequently, the lockout prohibition is superfluous if em-
ployer personnel actions are constrained by civil service rules upon the expiration of
a collective bargaining agreement.
Finally, the applicability of civil service requirements to personnel actions
during a strike would severely limit the ability of a public employer to provide
services to the community. Temporary replacements could be hired for only thirty
days, and transfers of non-unit employees also would be limited to thirty days. There
is no reason to believe that the Ohio General Assembly intended to place these
restrictions on the public employer's ability to maintain public services.
By declaring that the PECBL "prevails over any and all other conflicting
laws," 2 39 the Ohio General Assembly expressed its intention not to have Ohio
"public sector unionism and bargaining.., superimposed on a well developed,
explicit and, indeed, almost ossified alternate personnel system which went under the
folkloric term, civil service." 240 Consequently, strikers' replacement and reinstate-
ment rights should not be determined by the pre-existing civil service system. 241
234. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.22 (Page Supp. 1984).
235. J. O'la.Ly, supra note 10, at 255.
236. The Ohio civil service system was intended to promote merit-based personnel decisions by public employers.
See supra note 196.
237. Owo Riv. CoDE Am. § 4117.11(A)(7) (Page Supp. 1984).
238. In effect, a lockout denies public employees who are willing to work the opportunity to do so. Civil service
statutes prohibit employers from denying public employees the opportunity to work unless (1) there is just cause, id. §
124.34 (Page 1984), or (2) a lack of funds or a lack of work, id. § 124.321. A lockout situation does not come within
the statutory definition of just cause. Id. § 124.34. The lack of funds or lack of work layoff provision would not generally
be applicable when the employer's motive for denying its employees work is to bring pressure upon their union at the
bargaining table. Id. § 124.321. Thus, if civil service laws are not preempted by the PECBL, then its anti-lockout provision
would be unnecessary.
239. Id. § 4117.10(A) (Page Supp. 1984).
240. Weber, Prospects for the Future, in LABOR aEA1Sos LAw IN THE PuuC SECTOR 3, 5 (A. Knapp ed. 1977).
241. In State errel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Wells, 18 Ohio St. 3d 382, 384,481 N.E.2d 632, 634 (1985), the Ohio
Supreme Court concluded that section 4117.10(A) "was designed to free public employees from conflicting laws which
may act to interfere with the newly established right to collectively bargain." A statutory scheme that would permit some
members of the bargaining unit to be subject to permanent replacement in the event of a lawful strike while insulating
others from permanent replacement has the potential for interfering with the right to collectively bargain. Furthermore,
the Ohio Supreme Court has declared that "statutes [are to] be construed to avoid unreasonable or absurd consequences."
Id. Permitting some strikers to be permanently replaced while protecting fellow strikers from such action would certainly
lead to an absurd consequence. The better view would be to construe the PECBL to avoid such an anomalous result. The
civil service laws ought not be burdened with a load they were not meant to carry.
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Assuming that civil service rules do not limit a public employer's response to an
economic strike in Ohio, it must next be determined whether the due process clauses
in the federal or state constitutions restrict employers.
VI. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
A. The Ohio Constitution
Ohio civil service employees enjoy a cognizable interest in continuing employ-
ment, which can be abrogated only in accordance with the strictures of due process. 242
The Ohio Constitution provides that "every person, for an injury done him in his
land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law .... "243
This provision has been construed to contain the same limitations as the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. 244 Conse-
quently, the constitutionality of replacing lawfully striking public employees in Ohio
may be determined solely with reference to the federal constitution.
B. The United States Constitution
Because any action taken by a public employer with regard to the employment
status of a public employee constitutes state action, such action is circumscribed by
the requirements of the federal constitution. 245 Consequently, the constitutional
limitations on the freedom of a public employer to discharge public employees246
On the other hand, even if the civil service system does not determine replacement and reinstatement rights, its role
is nonetheless important. There seems to be little reason why public employers should not be bound by civil service
requirements in selecting and appointing replacements. The PECBL expressly asserts the primacy of the civil service
system in the selection and appointment of employees. Onjo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.08(B) (Page Supp. 1984). Similarly,
it would seem that civil service laws must be followed in selecting and appointing replacements. Other than prohibiting
the employment of unqualified public servants, this should impose little restriction on employers' ability to respond to
strikes while assuring that the basic thrust of the civil service laws is observed.
242. Jackson v. Kurtz, 65 Ohio App. 2d 152, 157-58, 416 N.E.2d 1064, 1068 (Hamilton County Ct. App. 1979);
see also Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 721 F.2d 550, 559 (6th Cir. 1983), affd, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).
243. Ofno CONsr., art. I, § 16.
244. In re Appropriation for Highway Purposes, Barnhardt v. Linzell, 104 Ohio App. 243, 243, 148 N.E.2d 242,
244 (Lorain County Ct. App. 1957) ("the phrase 'due course of law' as used in Section 16, Article I of the Constitution
of Ohio is equivalent in meaning to the phrase 'due process of law' as employed in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution"); Wilson v. City of Zanesville, 130 Ohio St. 286, 289, 199 N.E. 187, 189 (1935) ("the words
'due course of law' are equivalent in meaning to 'due process of law"'). See also State v. French, 71 Ohio St. 186, 201,
73 N.E. 216, 217 (1905); Salt Creek Valley Turnpike Co. v. Parks, 50 Ohio St. 568, 579, 35 N.E. 304, 306 (1893). But
see Beatrice Foods Co. v. Lindley, 70 Ohio St. 2d 29, 36, 434 N.E.2d 727, 732 (1982) (construing Ohio's due course
of law clause as not requiring a hearing prior to a taking because the "for an injury done him" language contemplates
a hearing only after the taking of property); Parfitt v. Columbus Correctional Facility, 62 Ohio St. 2d 434, 438, 406
N.E.2d 528, 531 (1980) ("There is no requirement, either direct or inferred, to grant a right to pre-termination
hearings . ..under the Ohio constitution's due course of law guarantee.").
245. Specifically, such action may not constitute a deprivation of liberty or property without due process or equal
protection of the laws in violation of the fifth or fourteenth amendments. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V, amend. XIV, § 1. The
issue, then, in the discharge of a public employee generally will be whether she had a property interest within the meaning
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments so as to fall under their protection. See generally Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972). Additionally, the issue may be whether the discharge was under circumstances that constitute a
deprivation of liberty within the meaning of those amendments and thus come under their protection. See id. at 572-74;
cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (policeman's discharge for failing to perform adequately did not constitute
deprivation of liberty interest); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (inaccurate listing of petitioner on active shoplifters
list did not infringe upon liberty interest protected by fourteenth amendment).
246. Historically, employment by the government was deemed a privilege rather than a right; therefore, the public
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must be examined to determine whether the replacement of economic strikers by
public employers is subject to the constraints of the federal constitution.
Constitutional challenges to employment decisions made by a public employer
usually are based upon the due process provisions of the Constitution.2 47 Since 1972,
the Supreme Court has evaluated all procedural due process claims within the
two-step framework set forth in Board of Regents v. Roth248 and Perry v. Sinder-
mann.249 First, to merit due process protection, the employee must possess a property
or liberty interest in her job which has been threatened or deprived by the govern-
mental employment decision. Second, if she enjoys such an interest, the employee is
entitled to a pre- or post-deprivation hearing whose requirements are to be determined
on a case-by-case basis.
Under the two-step Roth analysis, an employee facing replacement or discharge
is entitled to the safeguards of procedural due process only if she can demonstrate that
the public employer's action implicates a property or liberty interest protected by the
due process clause. If the employee fails to meet this threshold requirement, she must
settle for whatever procedures are provided by statute or regulation. 250
Thus, it is essential to determine what constitutes a protectable property interest
in public employment. Roth is the seminal case in this area. In Roth, a nontenured
state university professor was notified that he would not be rehired. 25t Under state
law, Roth had no tenure or other rights at the expiration of his contract. 252 Roth sued
the university in federal district court alleging that the university had violated his
fourteenth amendment rights. 253
In defining the characteristics of a property interest, the Court observed: "To
have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract
need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must,
instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."254 In determining whether such
a "legitimate claim of entitlement" existed, the Court noted that "[piroperty
employee had no entitlement to constitutional protections. See, e.g., Expare Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 225 (1839), in
which the Supreme Court held that the Constitution did not intend for inferior offices to be held for life and "it would
[therefore] seem to be a sound and necessary rule, to consider the power of removal as incident to the power of
appointment." Id. at 259. For a detailed discussion of the "right-privilege" doctrine, see Van Alstyne, The Demise of
the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HAsv. L. REv. 1439 (1968). See also Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 143-44 (1983) (tracing the doctrine's history); J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YorN, CON5stmnoNAL LAw 528-30
(2d ed. 1983) (tracing the distinction's collapse and citing sources).
247. U.S. Cossr. amend. V, amend. XIV, § 1. The fifth amendment provides in part: "[N]or [shall any person] be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . I..." d  amend. V. The fourteenth amendment in
part states: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
248. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
249. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
250. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-71 & n.8 (1972).
251. Id. at 566. David Roth had been hired by the university for only a fixed one-year term. Id.
252. Id. at 566-67. In fact, the only requirement was that the university inform Roth by February 1 of their intention
not to rehire him. Id. at 567. The president of the school so notified Mr. Roth, giving no reason for the decision. Id. at
568.
253. Id. at 568. The district court granted Roth's motion for partial summary judgment and ordered the university
to grant Roth a hearing and furnish him with reasons for their decision not to rehire him. Id. at 569. The court of appeals
affirmed, and the university appealed to the Supreme Court. Id.
254. Id. at 577.
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interests... are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to
those benefits.' '255
Applying this definition of property interests to Roth's teaching post, the Court
held that the university's summary refusal to renew Roth's contract failed to implicate
any property interest because state law placed these dismissals in the "unfettered
discretion of university officials.' '256
The facts in Sindermann differed from those in Roth only in that Sindermann
alleged that, despite the absence of any renewal guarantees in his contract, a de facto
tenure program had been established by the college's faculty guidebook.25 7 While
affirming that Roth's definition of property interests was not "limited by a few rigid,
technical forms, '258 the Court held that, if Sindermann could prove upon remand that
the guidebook created an entitlement to contined employment, he would have an
interest protected by the due process clause.25 9 The Court cautioned, however, that
the legitimacy of Sindermann's expectations turned on state law: "If it is the law of
Texas that a teacher in the respondent's position has no contractual or other claim to
job tenure, [his property] claim would be defeated." 260 Thus, state law determines the
existence and defines the contours of the employee's interest and the due process
clause protects only interests that rise to the level of property.
In Arnett v. Kennedy,261 a federal employee protected from dismissal except for
cause, challenged the constitutional sufficiency of the panoply of statutory procedural
protections available to him. Rejecting the plaintiffs claim, the three-Justice plural-
ity26 2 reasoned that, "where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined
with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that
right, [an employee] ... must take the bitter with the sweet. ' 263 In incorporating
procedure into the definition of the property interest, the plurality opinion in essence
collapsed the two steps of the Roth test into one. The remaining six Justices, however,
refused to restructure the Roth test. Although they agreed that the federal statute was
the source of the plaintiff's property interest, all six were unwilling to incorporate the
statutory limits on procedure into the property interest itself. In their view, the
procedures attendant to the deprivation of an employee's property interest could not
be insulated from independent judicial scrutiny. 264 The government employer pre-
vailed, however, because Justices Powell and Blackmun found that the statutory
255. Id.
256. Id. at 567.
257. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 600 (1972).
258. Id. at 601.
259. Id. at 599-603.
260. Id. at 602 n.7; see also id. at 603 (Burger, C.I., concurring) (emphasizing that the employment relationship
"is essentially a matter of . . .state law").
261. 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (plurality opinion).
262. Justice Rehnquist announced the Court's judgment in a plurality opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Stewart. See id. at 136.
263. Id. at 153-54.
264. See id. at 166-67 (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part);
id. at 177 (white, J., dissenting); id. at 211 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J. and Douglas, J., dissenting).
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procedures adequately protected the plaintiff's property interest and thus satisfied the
second step of the due process test.265
In Bishop v. Wood,266 the Court emphasized the crucial role of state law in due
process analysis. 267 Bishop, a North Carolina policeman who had been summarily
discharged, asserted a property interest arising from a city ordinance that classified
him as a permanent employee. The North Carolina Supreme Court had ruled in an
earlier case that, under North Carolina law, "an enforceable expectation of continued
public employment [could] exist only if the employer, by statute or contract, has
actually granted some form of guarantee.' '268 Although admitting that the ordinance
could "fairly be read as conferring ... a guarantee" of continued employment
absent cause for dismissal, 269 the Court deferred to the lower federal courts' conclu-
sion that the ordinance provided employment only on an at-will basis. Because
Bishop's interest in his job did not rise to the level of a property right, the city was
free to provide, or not provide, whatever discharge procedures it desired.
Even if an employee in the public sector has no property interest in her
employment, she is entitled to a due process notice and hearing when the discharge
constitutes a denial of a liberty interest cognizable under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. The Supreme Court first recognized that an employee may have a
liberty interest in her job in Meyer v. Nebraska.270 The Court held that liberty denotes
"the rights of an individual... to engage in any of the common occupations of
life." 271
In Roth, however, the Court established that only two liberty concerns poten-
tially implicated in the discharge of a public employee can trigger administrative
hearing rights: (1) an employee's interest in her good standing in the community and
(2) her interest in pursuing a career elsewhere. 272 In rejecting Roth's liberty claim, the
Court restrictively characterized the liberty interests in reputation and employment
opportunity. First, the Court held that the university had not implicated Roth's liberty
interest in reputation because, in declining to rehire Roth, it had not directed any
charges against him that could "seriously damage his standing and associations in his
community.' '273 Likewise, the Court narrowly construed Roth's interest in pursuing
a career elsewhere by holding that simple nonretention did not deprive Roth of liberty,
but merely rendered him "somewhat less attractive" to future employers. 274 To rise
to the level of a deprivation of liberty, the foreclosure of other employment oppor-
tunities must be more severe, such as regulations barring an employee from future
employment in a particular jurisdiction. 275
265. See id. at 167-71 (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part).
266. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
267. See id. at 344 & n.7.
268. Id. at 345 (citing Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971)).
269. Id.
270. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
271. Id. at 399.
272. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-74.(1972).
273. Id. at 573.
274. Id. at574 n.13.
275. See id. at 573-74.
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Since Roth, the Court has restricted further its definition of liberty interests. To
establish such an interest, a public employee now must (1) show that she was
stigmatized in connection with an alteration of her legal status as an employee, 276 (2)
allege that the stigma arose from substantially false characterizations of the employee
or her conduct,277 and (3) demonstrate that the damaging characterizations were made
public through channels other than the litigation initiated by the employee. 278
Once an employee has established a property or liberty interest, the second step
of the Roth analysis entitles her to "some kind of hearing. '"279 The Court has
formulated a balancing test for determining the procedures required once due process
rights arise. 280 This test mandates consideration of three factors: (1) the weight of the
employee's interest at stake, (2) the value of additional procedural safeguards in
enhancing administrative accuracy, and (3) the government's interest in avoiding
cumbersome proceedings. 281 The second step of the Roth test thus attempts to strike
a balance that ensures procedural fairness to public employees without handcuffing
governmental personnel directors.282
In Arnett v. Kennedy,283 the Court indicated that the courts were to approach
employees' procedural due process claims with deference to agency prerogative. In
his decisive concurring opinion, Justice Powell found that the array of procedures
afforded the employee satisfied the demands of due process. He reasoned that the
government's interest in "the maintenance of employee efficiency and discipline"
outweighed any interest the employee may have had in enhanced protections.
2 4
Thus, Arnett suggests that public employers ordinarily will be able to limit their
employees' property interests to the particular procedural protections the employers
choose to provide.2 85
However, in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,286 the Court's latest
word on property interests in public employment, Justice White emphasized that
although an entitlement may arise from state law, how much process is due is
determined by the due process clause, not state law. 287 Loudermill, a classified civil
service employee, was dismissed when his employer discovered that he had been
convicted of a felony, contrary to an assertion he had made on his job application. 288
276. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-12 (1976) (holding that a government action defaming an individual
implicates a liberty interest only when the action is accompanied by an alteration of the individual's legal status).
277. See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627 (1977) (per curiam) (ruling that an employee enjoys a right to an
administrative hearing only when an agency has proceeded against him on the basis of what he contends are substantially
false allegations).
278. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976) (holding that public employees' liberty interests are infringed
only when the asserted grounds for personnel actions are publicly disclosed).
279. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 & n.8 (1972).
280. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
281. Id.
282. See Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. Cu. L. REv. 739, 741, 745-46 (1976).
283. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
284. See id. at 168-71 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part); see Simon, Liberty and
Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 CauF. L. REv. 146, 163-65 (1983).
285. See Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62
CoaR-u. L. REv. 445, 464 (1977).
286. 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).
287. Id. at 1491-93.
288. Id. at 1489-90.
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Ohio law permitted dismissal only for cause and granted a right of post-termination
administrative review. 289 He claimed that the due process clause requires an oppor-
tunity to respond to charges prior to dismissal even though Ohio law did not provide
for such an opportunity. 290
In an opinion joined by eight Justices, the Court held that, although Loudermill's
property right was created by the Ohio statute, the limits on its protection must pass
federal scrutiny. "Property cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its
deprivation any more than can life or liberty." '2 9' According to the Court, "a full
adversarial evidentiary hearing prior to [termination]" need not be afforded where a
full post-termination hearing is provided. 292 Under the due process clause, however,
Loudermill was entitled to "oral or written notice of the charges .... an explanation
of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity" to respond prior to termination. 293
The Roth two-step framework should not preclude the replacement of lawful
economic strikers in response to a public employee strike. The Roth analysis first
requires that the replaced striker have a property interest in her job.294 State law
determines the existence and defines the contours of an employee's property inter-
est.29 5 Because Ohio neither recognizes implied contracts as a source of tenure for
public employees nor entertains promissory estoppel actions by public employees,2 96
public employees in Ohio have "an enforceable expectation of continued public
employment... only if the employer, by statute or contract, has actually granted
some form of guarantee.' '297 Thus, employees such as teachers who have contracts
guaranteeing continued employment or employees with tenure under civil service
statutes guaranteeing continued employment absent cause for dismissal have a stake
in their jobs that amounts to a property interest. Employees who have no guarantee
of continued employment are at-will employees whose stake in their jobs falls short
of being a property interest.
Because permanent replacements of tenured employees threatens a protected
property interest, it is necessary to determine the procedural due process to which a
lawfully striking employee is entitled before she can be permanently replaced. An
employee's property interest does not preclude an employer from taking an adverse
289. Id. at 1490.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1493.
292. Id. at 1495.
293. Id.
294. It is unlikely that any liberty concern is potentially implicated by the replacement of a striking public employee.
First, replacement while striking would not appear to implicate the employee's liberty interest in reputation because such
governmental action would not direct any charges against the employee that could "seriously damage his standing and
associations in his community." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). Second, replacement while striking
would not implicate an employee's interest in being able to pursue a career elsewhere since private employers are
prohibited from discriminating against employees because of their prior union activity, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982), as
are public employers in Ohio. OHIo REv. CODE AN. §§ 4117.11(A)(1), (3), (4) (Page Supp. 1984).
295. See supra text accompanying note 260.
296. "A public employee holds his position as a matter of law and not of contract." Jackson v. Kurtz, 65 Ohio App.
2d 152, 154, 416 N.E.2d 1064, 1066 (Hamilton County Ct. App. 1979). See also, Fuldauer v. City of Cleveland, 32 Ohio
St. 2d 114, 290 N.E.2d 546 (1972); State ex rel. Gordon v. Barthalow, 150 Ohio St. 499, 83 N.E.2d 393 (1948); Anderson
v. Minter, 32 Ohio St. 2d 207, 291 N.E.2d 457 (1972).
297. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345 (1976).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
personnel action, such as permanent replacement, against that employee. Instead, the
procedures provided to the employee must meet the requirements of the due process
clause. "'The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be
heard' . . . 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. '298 Consequently, it
would appear that the due process requirements would be satisfied if the employer
notifies the striking employees prior to hiring permanent replacements that the strikers
must make an unconditional offer to return to work by a certain date, or else seek to
be heard on their claim that they are not engaging in a strike. Offering a pre-
replacement notice and an opportunity to be heard should meet the constitutional
guidelines set forth in Loudermill.299
Thus, under Roth and its progeny, the due process clause should not prevent the
permanent replacement of tenured public employees. Consequently, the right of
public employers to permanently replace strikers is a statutory question rather than a
constitutional one.
VII. THE RIGHT OF PUBLIC EMPLOYERS IN OTHER STATES TO REPLACE
LAWFUL STRIKERS
In the eleven states other than Ohio where certain public employees may engage
in lawful strikes, 300 no reported decision has expressly confronted and decided the
issue of the replacement of lawful strikers. Several decisions, however, have as-
sumed, sub silentio, that public employers possess such a right.
In Board of Trustees v. State,30' the Montana Supreme Court did not question
the employer's assertion that it had a right to permanently replace school teachers
engaged in a lawful economic strike. The school district mailed a letter to each of its
striking teachers stating that the teacher would be replaced unless he or she returned
to work by October 15, 1975.302 Citing private sector cases construing the NLRA, the
school district contended that the "letters simply informed its striking teachers of
what the District had a legal right to do, namely to replace teachers who refused to
return to work after October 15, 1975."303 Even though the Montana Collective
Bargaining Act3°4 does not address the right of public employers to replace lawful
economic strikers, the Montana Supreme Court did not question the employer's claim
that it had a legal right "to permanently replace nonreturning workers after a specified
date. ' 30 5 Instead, the court ruled that the letter sent to the teachers with a deadline
for returning to work was an unfair labor practice because "[t]he District's failure to
hire replacement teachers after the deadline passed suggests that the District's primary
298. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914), and
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,552(1965)). See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1495
(1985) (concluding that a pretermination notice and opportunity to respond is a "fundamental due process requirement").
299. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LoudermUll, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1495 (1985).
300. See supra note 13.
301. 604 P.2d 778 (Mont. 1979).
302. Id. at 779.
303. Id. at 781.
304. Mo0r. CODE ANN. §§ 39-31-101 to -409 (1983).
305. Bd. of Trustees v. State. 604 P.2d 778, 781 (Mont. 1979).
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motivation was to halt the strike rather than to keep its schools open.' ' 3 6 Thus, if the
school district had in fact replaced its striking teachers, it apparently would not have
committed an unfair labor practice. The court assumed that replacing lawful strikers
to keep schools open is permissible.
Similarly, in Local 1494, International Association of Firefighters v. City of
Coeur d'Alene, 30 7 the Idaho Supreme Court clearly indicated in dictum that it believed
that, in the face of legislative silence, public employers have the right to replace
lawful economic strikers. The city's firefighters engaged in a strike after an impasse
in negotiations, and the city discharged them. The court held that the strike was not
illegal and that the discharges were unlawful because the city had bargained in bad
faith.3 08 In effect, the court ruled that the firefighters were engaged in an unfair labor
practice strike,309 and thus could not be discharged. The court, however, did not
confine its discussion to the legality of discharging public employees engaged in a
lawful strike provoked by the employer's bad faith bargaining. Instead, the court
indicated that if the employer had not engaged in bad faith bargaining, and if the
employees had struck lawfully to support their bargaining demands (i.e., an economic
strike), then the employer would have had "cause" to discharge them within the
meaning of the civil service laws if they had not reported to work when ordered to do
so. 310 Consequently, according to this dictum, the firefighters' right to strike does not
include a right not to be discharged in the event a strike occurs. Thus, although the
court speaks in terms of "discharge" rather than "replacement," Idaho law appears
to track private sector law: unfair labor practice strikers cannot be replaced or
discharged while economic strikers receive less protection-possible permanent
replacement in the private sector and possible discharge in Idaho.
The Michigan Supreme Court has also assumed, without analysis or discussion,
that public employers have the same right to replace strikers as their private sector
counterparts. In Rockwell v. Crestwood School District Board of Education,311 the
Michigan Supreme Court observed:
When public employees strike, the public employer must, like a private employer, be able
to hire substitute employees so that the public business is not interrupted. In order to hire
competent replacements, it may be necessary for the public employer to offer permanent
306. Id.
307. 99 Idaho 630, 586 P.2d 1346 (1978).
308. "IT]he City . .. did not act in good faith in the bargaining process, but pursued a hard line approach to the
problem, the effect of which drove the Firefighters to the wall and into a strike. ... Id. at 643, 586 P.2d at 1359
(quoting the lower court's opinion).
309. Idaho does not have a comprehensive public sector collective bargaining statute that sets forth what constitutes
an employer unfair labor practice. The employer's course of conduct in this case-including unilateral withdrawal of
benefits, bad faith bargaining, and a refusal to bargain-would be an unfair labor practice in most jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
Otno R-v. Coos ANN. § 4117.11(A)(5) (Page Supp. 1984); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
310. "We likewise reject the extreme viewpoint at the opposite end of the spectrum, namely, that the firefighters
were . . . insulated from discharge if they chose to exercise their right to strike." Local 1494, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters
v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 643, 586 P.2d 1346, 1359 (1978). According to the court, in the absence of
protective contractual language or bad faith employer bargaining, the employees' refusal to return to work during a lawful
strike when ordered to do so gives the city "cause" for discharge under the state's civil service laws. Id. at 643, 586 P.2d
at 1359. See IDAHo CoD § 50-1609 (1980).
311. 393 Mich. 616, 227 N.W.2d 736 (1975).
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employment and thus displace strikers. Where essential services have been suspended, the
hiring of replacements often cannot await time-consuming adjudicatory processes.312
This statement concerning strike replacements was made in the context of
deciding that the due process clause did not require a hearing before the strikers were
replaced. The implicit assumption, again, was that public employers have the right to
permanently replace strikers. 3 13
Although three jurisdictions have assumed that public employers should have the
right to replace striking public employees, no reasons have been advanced for this
result other than automatic deference to private sector decisions.
VIM. As A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY, WHAT RIGHT SHOULD PUBLIC
EMPLOYERS HAVE TO REPLACE LAWFUL ECONOMIC STRIKERS?
As we have seen, no definitive answer exists to the question whether public
employees in Ohio may legally replace workers engaged in a lawful economic strike.
No compelling reasons exist for either rejecting outright private sector precedents or
importing them wholesale into the Ohio public sector. The legislative history and the
statutory scheme itself provide no guidance. Because of the PECBL's supremacy
clause, the Ohio civil service laws should not determine employers' striker replace-
ment rights. Neither the Ohio nor the federal constitution precludes the replacement
of striking public employees. Furthermore, no other jurisdiction has presented
persuasive arguments for determining what the extent of the public employer's right
to replace lawfully striking workers should be. Consequently, the SERB and the
courts will have to base their determination of this issue primarily upon their view of
the competing public policy considerations. This section reviews the possible options
and concludes that-as a matter of public policy-Ohio public employers should have
the right to continue operating during a lawful strike with temporary workers, but
Ohio public employers should not have the right to hire permanent replacements for
lawful economic strikers.
To begin the analysis of public policy arguments, assume that a union calls a
strike of Ohio public employees. The union has surmounted all the procedural hurdles
to obtain its legal right to strike and is prepared to exercise this weapon to resolve a
negotiating impasse with the employer. When the employees go out on strike, what
may the employer do? May it attempt to continue operating? May it replace the
strikers with newly hired employees? May it permanently imperil the strikers' jobs?
A starting point in determining the position the SERB and the courts should take
in the absence of legislative guidance is to consider one polar extreme-the lais-
sez-faire position. By this view the SERB should do absolutely nothing. The essence
of collective bargaining is an economic struggle. Strike action is the union's chief
weapon; the union attempts to deny the employer its supply of labor until the latter
is willing to improve its contract offer. But the employer is perfectly entitled to resist
312. Id. at 634-35, 227 N.W.2d at 744.
313. It must be noted, however, that Michigan law prohibits public employee strikes. MicH. Co.mu. LAws § 423.206
(1984).
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that effort; its major instrument is its right to control the means of operation. If the
employer can find enough workers who are willing to work for the offer which has
been rejected by the union, then it should be entitled to keep operating. Only in this
way will corresponding pressure be placed upon the strikers to moderate their
demands. In essence, this was the common law position3i 4 and is the position largely
prevalent in British labor law today. 315
The laissez-faire position should be rejected by the SERB. Doing nothing is
totally inconsistent with the legislative scheme for regulating public sector strikes in
Ohio. The Ohio General Assembly has rejected the no-holds-barred, anything-goes
economic warfare model. 316 The PECBL narrowly circumscribes who can strike,
when they can strike, and what weapons they can use. 317 Furthermore, even private
sector labor law definitely has moved beyond the laissez-faire point in at least one
respect: It guarantees the economic striker her employee status, although not neces-
sarily her job.318
The line drawn under the NLRA between discharge (which is prohibited) and
permanent replacement (which is permitted) has troubled many observers as a legal
distinction without a factual difference which can and does work a gross injustice. 3 19
There are compelling reasons why this distinction should not be superimposed on the
regulatory scheme devised under the PECBL. Employees engaged in a lawful strike
are exercising the right of collective action protected by the statute. 320 They have
followed the entire battery of complex legal restrictions for exercising this right. They
should not risk loss of their jobs and benefits such as vacation, accumulated sick pay,
and pension rights earned through years of service. Some may be too old to find
comparable jobs without uprooting their families and leaving their local communities.
The sight of replacements going through picket lines creating this threat to the
working career of regular employees often incites the violence that occasionally mars
our system of labor relations. 321 The law should seek to avoid such unfortunate
events, especially in public sector labor relations.
The Mackay rule permits an employer to destroy, perhaps permanently, a
striker's right to her job by hiring a replacement. The practical operation of the
Mackay rule is indefensible and impossible to square with the purpose of the PECBL.
First, the right to hire replacements is more beneficial to an employer when the union
is relatively weak. 322 Thus, such a rule exacerbates disparities in bargaining power
rather than establishing equality of bargaining power between the parties. Second, the
314. See Vegelahn v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
315. See Wedderbum, The New Structure of Labour Law in Britain, 13 IsRAE. L. REv. 435, 449-50 (1978) (noting
that British labor law is "'non-interventionist" and that British employers are free to dismiss all employees who have gone
on strike).
316. See supra notes 145-73 and accompanying text.
317. See supra Section B.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 51-68.
319. See supra notes 80-105 and accompanying text.
320. Omo REv. COOE Ar. § 4117.14(D)(2) (Page Supp. 1984).
321. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 190, at 202-03; Stewart & Townsend, Strike Violence: The Need for Federal
Injunctions, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 459, 460 (1966).
322. See Weiler, supra note 80, at 394; see also supra note 103.
19851
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:639
Mackay rule endangers peaceful prosecution of the strike. 323 Third, the rule may be
used to eliminate collective bargaining altogether. 324
Therefore, the SERB should provide guarantees to legal strikers that they can
return to their jobs if and when they wish to end their strike. The employer remains
free to operate and supply services to the community and is free to hire replacements
in order to do so. The assumption is that the employer can and should attract
replacements without promising them permanent preference over strikers. 325 An
employer cannot guarantee permanent preference in any event; if the union has the
strength to win an acceptable settlement, that settlement almost invariably gives
return-to-work privileges to the strikers, and often will require discharge of their
replacements. 326 In those cases where the union does not have the power to do this
on its own, where the strike has been a miscalculation of relative economic and
political power, the SERB should hold that it is the strike replacements, not the legal
strikers, who risk the loss of their jobs if the end of the strike results in more
employees than available jobs.327
323. Gillespie, supra note 80, at 787 (footnote omitted) ("Since the permanent replacement doctrine raises the stakes
for both employees and the union, it exacerbates the strife between labor and management. The threat of violence
accompanying the use of permanent replacements at least partly explains state strikebreaker statutes that attempt to limit
the use of replacements.") (footnote omitted). See also authorities cited in note 321 supra.
324. Schatzki, supra note 51, at 383 (The Mackay doctrine "is an invitation to the employer, if he is able, to rid
himself of union adherents and the union."). See also supra note 96; infra note 327.
325. Schatzki, supra note 51, at 391-92; see also Gillespie, supra note 80.
326. Weiler, supra note 80, at 392.
327. The ouster of strike replacements at the conclusion of the strike should pose no constitutional problems because
they would have no "enforceable expectation of continued public employment," Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345
(1976), if their employer is not permitted to grant them permanent employment. See supra text accompanying notes
266-69.
Another argument for prohibiting the permanent replacement of lawful strikers can be based on an analysis of the
reasons for operating during a strike. The employer's decision to continue operations during a lawful strike may be
motivated by either defensive or offensive considerations. If defensive considerations are the basis for the decision to
operate, then the employer's goal is to take a strike so that it can continue providing services for its constituents. On the
other hand, if offensive considerations are the basis for the decision to operate, then the employer's goal is to break the
strike and the union. These two motivations are not discrete categories. They are instead two points on a continuum. In
the middle of these two polar motivations, of course, is the obvious fact that operating during a strike can weaken a union
and increase management's bargaining power, regardless of whether the employer's motivation is offensive or defensive.
For an excellent discussion of the considerations involved in operating during a strike in the private sector see C. PERv,
A. KRm"iR & T. SCHNEIDER, OPERTN DURING STRIKES: CoiPANY ExPRIEocE, NLRB PoucEs, ANn GovERN!4'.rAL. REuLAio.%s
(1982).
Because the Ohio General Assembly's purpose in enacting the PECBL was to "promot[e] orderly and constructive
relationships between all public employers and their employees," OHio REv. ConE ANN. § 4117.22 (Page Supp. 1984),
continuing operations during a lawful strike should be a defensive weapon for public employers designed to serve the
narrow economic and political purpose of maintaining services, not an offensive weapon to break the union. Any employer
operating simply to cut its strike losses and to maintain services should do so in a manner that would not threaten the jobs
of striking workers or the status of the striking union. Under the PECBL, the public employer should have neither the
intention nor the desire to replace the strikers permanently. If management's objective is to offset union bargaining power
and to provide services for its constituents rather than to break the union, then management should be content with using
temporary employees, supervisors, and other nonbargaining-unit employees, not permanent new hires. See generally C.
PERRY, A. KRAtER & T. ScHEItIER, supra.
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Should the SERB go the next step? 328 Should it decide that when the employees
have legally gone on strike, the employer cannot replace them with temporary
workers in order to keep operating and supplying services to the public? Such a legal
rule would imply a quite different conception of the legitimate calculation of
economic and political pressures in a public sector strike. During the strike, the
employees are without regular paychecks. This loss of income presumably places
economic pressures on the employees and on their union to compromise. Under the
view that public employers may not use temporary replacements, the employer would
face an analogous political pressure because its operation would be shut down and it
would have stopped supplying services to its constituents. But if the employer is able
to use replacements to continue supplying services, then the absence of serious
political pressures on the employer to settle can produce a long and bitter strike,
violence on the picket line, confrontation with the police, and possibly the breaking
of the union.3 29
Although there is some force to these arguments for prohibiting the employer
from using temporary replacements, they are not persuasive. For example, consider
the case of a small unit in an employer's operation. The unit employees may perform
work that is integral to the entire operation. If they go on strike to win their demands
by shutting down the employer, should the supervisors be able to bar the employer
from replacing the striking employees, even when the other unions disapprove of the
strikers' objectives and would cross the picket lines to supply services to the public?
The SERB should not give that much power to a single union.
Second, such a legal rule addresses only one side of the political-economic
equation during a strike. It prohibits the employer from supplying services to its
constituents during a strike, but it does not prohibit the employees from working
elsewhere while on strike. Both for reasons of principle and of administrative
feasibility, the right of workers to seek work elsewhere should not be restricted. By
the same token, however, the SERB should not prohibit employers from hiring
temporary replacements who are willing to work at rates and conditions which they
consider acceptable and the employer believes are economically feasible.
328. Because public employers should feel constrained to avoid violence and to maintain a working spirit between
labor and management, see Otuo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.22 (Page Supp. 1984), it could be argued that public employers
should not be permitted to continue operations during a strike regardless of the strike's motivation. See supra note 327.
The decision to operate during a strike, if implemented successfully, threatens to undermine the union's basic power asset
in collective bargaining-the strike. Because unions and unionized workers are unlikely to be sanguine about such a threat,
management must expect that the union and its members will use a wide range of tactics-including, perhaps, violence-
to make successful continuing operations as difficult as possible.
Furthermore, the fundamental effect, even if it is not the purpose, of operating during a strike is to alter the balance
of power in collective bargaining in management's favor by limiting economic and political losses resulting from a strike.
In the short run, this enhanced bargaining power should enable management to secure a more favorable settlement than
would have been the case in the event of nonoperation. In the long run, this enhanced bargaining power should result in
a series of more modest settlements, possibly to the point of seriously weakening the perceived effectiveness of a union
in representing employees. Such management "victories," however, are not likely to be won easily. They may have to
be won at the price of increased tension, if not bitterness, in both employee and union relations, both immediately after
a strike and over the long run as workers and unions vent whatever frustration they experience as a result of management's
enhanced bargaining power. Consequently, a strong argument exists that Ohio public employers should not be permitted
to continue operations at all in the event of a lawful strike because of the likely effect of operating during a strike on the
"relationships between all public employers and their employees." Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 4117.22 (Page Supp. 1984).
329. See supra note 327.
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Finally, and in some instances most importantly, such a legal rule would provide
the public employer with no means of providing services that are essential to the
public's safety or health, 330 after the statutory 63-day injunction. 331
Thus, prohibiting a public employer from replacing employees legally on strike
is too harsh. 332 On the spectrum of possible restraints on employer responses to a legal
strike, the SERB should limit the employer to temporary replacements.
The scope of replacement rights of public employers and the reinstatement rights
of public employees must be defined in a way that best accommodates the essential
interests of government employers and employees, as well as those of the public. The
approach proposed here for defining replacement rights-permitting the employer to
continue operating with temporary replacements, but prohibiting permanent replace-
ments-attempts to harmonize the government employer's dual role as public man-
ager and public services provider. When the employer is also the government, one
must reconcile not only the conflicting interests that typically spark disagreement
between any employer and its employees, but also must take into account the
particular responsibilities of government as the entity entrusted with carrying out
public policy on behalf of all the people. As this Article has argued, the public
employer's right to replace should be defined in a way that will foster collective
bargaining, by protecting striking employees not only against outright discharge, but
also against forfeiture of their jobs to permanent replacements. On the other hand, the
government's dual identity as both employer and governor must be accommodated by
permitting the public employer to continue providing services to the public during a
legal strike through the use of temporary replacements.
IX. CONCLUSION
The development of the law of public employment in Ohio should be guided by
three separate but interrelated considerations. First, Ohio's public employment law
should reflect the differences between public and private sector employment. The
civil service system is an explicit acknowledgment that public employees should be
afforded different treatment than their private sector counterparts. The tenure system
protecting civil servants against dismissals without cause grew out of the concern that
unfettered employer discretion would result in a patronage system that would distort
the political process and hinder the providing of government services.
Second, the government as sovereign stands in a different relation to public
servants than does the private sector employer to its employees. For example, the
constitutional protections afforded government employees against their employers are
not extended to private sector employees. The desire for responsive government,
however, has led the courts to temper the constitutional rights of public employees in
order to facilitate management's ability to supervise and control its work force.
330. See H. Wlauimro, & R. \Vwrs, supra note I11, at 21-24 (arguing that government services are generally
"essential" to the public's safety, health, and welfare).
331. Oulo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.16 (Page Supp. 1984); see supra text accompanying note 25.
332. See Weiler, supra note 80, at 412-14 (arguing that private sector law should not be altered to prohibit employers
from operating during a lawful strike by their employees).
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A third guiding force in the development of public employment law in Ohio
should be the interaction among the civil service system, the PECBL, and constitu-
tional law. The complexity of the interrelationships among these three sources of
public employment law must be heeded in fashioning doctrine in the public employ-
ment sphere.
This Article maintains that public employers should not have the right to replace
permanently any public employees engaged in a lawful economic strike. Such a
position constitutes a major departure from private sector principles, where, as a
practical matter, permanent replacement of economic strikers is the most effective
weapon that a private employer has in its arsenal to combat economic strikes.
Consequently, this Article examines all the considerations that are relevant to the
question and discusses possible objections to the position taken.
Imposing the Mackay doctrine on the Ohio public sector collective bargaining
scheme would both unnecessarily devalue the rights of public employees and undercut
the public's interest in reducing labor strife. This Article argues that the public
employer's right to replace lawful strikers can be defined in a way that would better
accommodate the essential interests of government employers and employees, as well
as those of the public. The temporary replacement approach, coupled with the
temporary right to subcontract and to use supervisors and non-bargaining unit
personnel, harmonizes the government employer's dual role as public manager and
provider of public services, without rendering public employees' hard-won collective
bargaining and strike rights an illusory gain.
Notwithstanding its outdated tone, the position that the SERB and the Ohio
courts should take is wisely and poignantly capsulized by Andrew Carnegie, the
founder of the Carnegie Steel Company:
I would have the public give due consideration to the terrible temptation to which the
workingman on a strike is sometimes subjected. To expect that one dependent on his daily
wage for the necessaries of life will stand by peaceably, and see a new man employed in
his stead is to expect much. The poor man may have a wife and children dependent on his
labor. Whether medicine for a sick child, or even nourishing food for a delicate wife, is
procurable, depends upon his steady employment.... No wise employer will lightly lose
his old employees. Length of service counts for much in many ways. Calling upon strange
men should be the last resort.333
333. Quoted in L. WomF, LocKouTr THE STORY OF THE HomEsm.m STRIKE OF 1892: A STUDY OF VIOLENCE, UMONISM, AND
Thm CARNEIE STEEL Rmmi 28 (1965).
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